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ABSTRACT

Labor Unions and Corporate Campaigns: Necessary Tactic or a Hindrance to
Bargaining
by
Cynthia Elise Agnello
Dr. John Tuman, Committee Chair
Professor o f Political Science
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas

The author examined occurrences o f corporate campaigns between 1990-2004 in
order to evaluate the effectiveness o f union’s use o f non-traditional strategies in
achieving business concessions. Cases included were those representing the presence o f
litigation, coalition building, exerted pressures on financial associates, efforts to compel
regulatory agencies investigations o f businesses breaches o f law, pressuring government,
on-job actions, and waging negative publicity campaigns. This study built upon the past
work o f Paul Jarley and Cheryl L. M aranto’s that originated three categories o f contexts
for campaigns: organizing campaigns, strike complement, and strike substitute corporate
campaigns. These labor action stages set the foundation in which the success or failure o f
the various tactics could be measured.
The research conducted by this study explored ideal combinations o f tactics useful in
specific labor action situations, subsequently suggesting more coherent strategies for
winning employer concessions.
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CHAPTER 1

mTRODUCTION
Transformations o f the American economy from a domestically based labor force to a
global one, manual labor to increased automation, manufacturing to service employment,
and expansive deregulation have all combined to change the balance o f power between
business and labor in the United States. Government and business have restructured and
adapted to new economic realities, but labor unions have been slow to address these
challenges. The traditional power o f labor was based on a blue-collar workforce and
collective bargaining with employees. This image is quickly fading. Union density has
decreased and the proportion o f employees covered by collective bargaining agreements
has steadily declined, resulting in a workforce that has neither benefited nor mobilized
under ideals o f worker social justice. What is present now is a dichotomy between
traditional bargaining practices and non-traditional corporate campaigns.

Research Question
The emerging inequality o f power between labor and business has prompted unions to
explore aggressive strategies aimed at pressuring management into bargaining by
targeting their bottom lines. The predominant method currently employed by labor
focused on this type o f coercion is the corporate campaign.
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The research question explored in this study is: Have unions that engaged in
corporate campaigns been effective in gaining concessions from businesses? For the
purposes o f this study, corporate campaigns are defined as actions, either legal or illegal,
that unions may use in an effort to force an employer to make concessions. This
definition is a bare bones fusion o f corporate campaign descriptions existing in the
literature. Tactics used in corporate campaign include: litigation, coalition building,
pressuring the company’s financial associates, on-job actions, exerting pressure on
government officials, efforts to compel regulatory agencies investigations o f businesses
breaches o f law, and negative publicity campaigns.

igure 1.1: Corporate Campaigns: Contexts and Tactics
Union Engaged in a Corporate
Campaign

Tactics used by
Unions during a
Corporate
Campaigns

Contexts o f Corporate
Campaigns
!
Strike
Substitute

•

\
Organizing
Campaign
I ---Strike
Complement
Campaign

Coalition Building
Pressuring
Government
Pressuring
Financial
Associates
Use of
Regulatory
Agencies
On-job
Actions

Whether
Unions Gain
Sought after
Concessions
from
Business

Litigation
Negative
Publicity
Campaigns
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The ultimate goal o f a corporate campaign, as seen above in Figure 1.1, is for workers
to acquire all sought after concessions from business. Concessions may possibly include
better contract terms in regards to wages, safer work conditions, pensions, healthcare,
work-hours, and/or job security. Another objective may be to initially establish union
representation, as with the previously discussed organizing campaign. Outcomes
regarding finalizing a contract or being allowed to return to work after a strike or lockout
might also be the definition o f management concessions. Every campaign is distinct, in
terms o f contexts and tactics, and has been waged for different reasons; the examples
provided demonstrates what defines a positive end-result for unions that participate in
corporate campaigns.

Purpose and Structure o f the Study
The overall purpose o f evaluating the success or failure o f corporate campaigns is to
reveal combinations o f tactics useful in specific labor actions that are associated with
more coherent strategies for winning employer concessions. The research conducted in
this thesis explores whether labor is able to accomplish this end.
The foundation o f the study is chapter two. It provides a background on the literature
covering the emergence o f corporate campaigns and their place in the labor movement.
Also explored is an explanation o f resource mobilization theory and its associations to the
broader context o f social movements. This theory is useful for investigating the reasons
why group behavior has a direct bearing on situational. Whether workers’ united actions
aid in gaining concession victories is the key outcome.
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Chapter three contains an overview into business practices and employment trends
that clarify why unions have chosen to undertake corporate campaign strategies.
Furthermore, the inclusion o f recent business developments towards labor provides
details as to why this type o f labor action is the new weapon used to retaliate against
current economic trends.
Chapter four outlines the methodology o f the study, providing details o f the variables
and how they are linked together through the research design. Also incorporated in this
chapter is an analysis o f the appropriateness o f case selection and an identification o f the
limitations o f the study’s methods and design.
Chapter five presents and examines each case in which corporate campaign strategies
were used. In this chapter, backgrounds o f each union are given, the tactics and contexts
that characterize each union’s actions are compared and contrasted between cases, and
outcomes are assessed.
Chapter six offers conclusions regarding whether corporate campaigns are an
effective strategy in an environment o f economic realities that threaten job security.
Presented as well are concluding remarks summarizing possible implications o f the study
for unions and social movement literature as a whole.

Significance o f the Study
Analysis o f corporate campaigns is worthwhile, because it is a recent and relatively
unexplored phenomenon. In addition, there have not been many comprehensive
examinations o f divergences from traditional collective bargaining.
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The bulk o f prior research primarily focused on traditional forms o f union actions
such as strikes and collective bargaining. This thesis builds upon Perry and Jarley and
Maranto’s research in order to clarify and analyze the effectiveness o f the alternative
tactics that unions employ (Perry 1987; Jarley and Maranto 1990). It is also significant
because it has broader relevance to social and political science in terms o f its linkage to
workers’ rights in the broader context o f social movements. In other words, there are
implications for our understanding o f why individuals undertake collective labor action to
further their quality o f life through united efforts focused on attacking a company’s lines
o f production and/or potential revenue.
An expected finding o f this study will be a tentative answer as to whether corporate
campaigns are an effective tool in gaining concessions from employers. If campaigns are
found to be a better method than traditional bargaining, it could result in unions
possessing a valuable approach to achieving their sought after goals. The larger
implications o f this analysis will be if this research is predictive o f combinations o f
tactics that are useful in precise contexts, that is to say specific stages o f labor action.
Another potential significance o f this study may be for the application o f corporate
campaign tactics in the global arena. The value o f this radical type o f bargaining and
corporate coercion could then be analyzed to see if it has applicability in the contexts o f
neo-corporatism and emerging unionization in developing countries. Neo-corporatism is
defined as certain social groups, whether they are business interests or labor associations,
which have privileged access to the state and input forming policies (Hart 1992).
Furthermore, these groups are organized groups are co-opted and institutionalized into
government structures and contribute to policy making processes concerning industry
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regulation, trade and wages (Streeck and Schmitter 1985). These embedded industries,
labor representatives, and political leaders formulate and execute economic policy. Some
o f the developing countries and industries that may be susceptible to an corporate
campaign actions are the following countries with emerging markets and increasing
unionization Republic o f Korea’s electronic and auto industries, Malaysia’s rubber and
petroleum enterprises, Singapore’s electronic, chemical and petroleum refining
businesses, Brazil’s food processing, petroleum, chemical and steel plants, Argentina’s
textile and vehicle/parts production, M exico’s auto manufacturing and petroleum
companies, and South Africa’s chemical and mining concerns (Jose 2000).
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY
Since the late 1970s, scholars have taken notice o f unions increased use o f corporate
campaigns. Some view it as the means necessary to make labor more mobile and flexible,
in order to keep up with how corporations have restructured themselves to compete in the
global economy. Business has become ‘leaner and m eaner’ incorporating changes to
increase productivity and cut costs (Champlin and Knoedler 1999). Corporate campaigns
are attempts to address these new transformations in the economic environment through
focused strategies executed to bring management into bargaining and counter unfriendly
labor actions through targeting a company’s points o f vulnerability in order to decrease
its profits (Heckscher 1988).
Others authors see the incorporation o f new tactics as facilitating the overall
expansion o f union membership, resulting in a revitalized worker’s social movement.
They estimate this will increase the status o f unions through increasing the power of
unions as a whole. This perspective supports restructuring in order to change values and
objectives within unions so that they can gain external benefits, such as increasing
membership (Moody 1988). Reorganization would include forging multi-union
connections to coordinate bargaining “across industrial lines to attack the centers o f
capital” (Moody 1988, p.341). Extended solidarity and mobilization could increase the
legitimacy o f picket lines, strengthen the ability unions to use their combined leverage to

7

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

prompt equitable contract negotiations, and may gamer widespread public support for
workers.
The discussion in this chapter focuses on the definitions o f corporate campaigns, past
research designs, and conclusions o f prior studies. Also explored is resource mobilization
theory. Specifically, how it relates to corporate campaigns in terms o f its core
assumptions, its framing o f group power, and how the tenets influence and explain
corporate campaign actions.

Definitions o f Corporate Campaigns
There is no consensus on how to define corporate campaigns. There is also no
conclusive classification o f what actions and expected outcomes delineate the success or
failure o f a campaign.
Kim Moody’s book An Injury to All: The Decline o f American Unionism.
credited Ray Rogers as the first to coin the term “corporate campaigns”. Also
highlighted, were the tactics Rogers used during the Amalgamated Clothing Worker
strikes in 1972 at the Far ah Manufacturing Company in El Paso. His actions established
the basic strategies that other unions would follow when conducting corporate
campaigns. Rogers’ techniques
“involved a combination o f tactics such as consumer boycotts, legal appeals,
attempts to broaden the issues from simple labor relations to moral or social
matters, and pressures on interlocking sectors o f business and financial
community in hopes o f isolating the offending employer” (Moody 1988, p.306).
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In the study, Moody explored the applications o f Rogers’ stratagem through case
studies o f the J.P. Stevens, Far ah, Phelp’s Dodge, Louisiana Pacific, and BASF
campaigns. Moody found that the emergence o f these types o f approaches came at a time
when many involved in union leadership expressed anti-business stances. These attitudes
led unions to go “beyond the normal conduct o f business unionism” (Moody 1988,
p.307). Normal ‘business unionism’ adheres to conduct which is characterized by a
reciprocal business/union relationship, emphasizing common interests. This partnership is
operationalized through the labor contract, which is the product o f collective bargaining.
Charles Perry provides an alternate definition, viewing corporate campaigns as using
bad publicity against a business in order to escalate a conflict from self-interest to the
context o f a social movement occurring in the public sphere (Perry 1987). E.E.
Schattschneider, in his book The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View o f Democracy
in America, support the position that conflicts must go beyond the scope o f self-interest,
or as he terms it, “privatization” (Schattschneider 1960, p. 7), to a broader context,
“socialization o f conflict” (Schattschneider 1960, p. 7). Schattschneider posits that the
socialization o f a conflict seeks to expand outsiders’ views o f the battle from privatized
concerns— isolated or individualistic issues, to the ideas o f equality, justice, and freedom
o f association, in this case, freedom to engage in union membership. Socialization o f a
clash influences mass perceptions and frames the contentious issues in a way the public
may more easily identify with and support (Schattschneider 1960). This heightened
atmosphere combined with a rallying public may potentially lead to management
conceding to negotiations.
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According to Perry, union corporate campaigns are successful when they result in
bringing management to the bargaining table. Charles Heckscher’s characterization o f a
corporate campaign is very similar. He sees them as “a tactic o f bringing pressure to bear
on corporations that mistreat their workers” (Heckscher 1988, p.235). His definition and
case studies are narrowly focused to those instances in which unions exposed corporate
malfeasance through negative publicity campaigns and public relations techniques that
encouraged public support for traditional union goals; for instance, expanded benefits in a
newly renegotiated contract. These assessments, however, are not applicable to other
situations in which workers would use corporate campaigns to gain non-traditional
advantages in negotiations. One example o f a ‘non-traditionaP goal is a campaign
focused on the resignation o f a hostile board member in order to eliminate opposition to
an organizing campaign.
The American Federation o f Labor-Congress o f Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)
offers an additional definition;
“A coordinated campaign applies pressure to the many points o f vulnerability to
convince the company to deal fairly and equitably with the union.. .It means
seeking vulnerabilities in all o f the company’s political and economic
relationships— with other unions, shareholders, customers, creditors, and
government agencies—to achieve union goals” (Perry, p. 2).
Although this definition offers a concise assessment o f what a corporate campaign is,
it does not detail the available methods that may be used to achieve those ends.
‘Pressuring’ a company is not sufficiently illustrated in this definition.

10
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Another, more comprehensive and recent explanation o f the term comes from the
legal cases Diamond Walnut Growers v. NLRB and Food Lion v. United Food &
Commercial Workers International Union. Both cases were brought before the D C.
Court o f Appeals in 1997. The definition given at these hearings was that corporate
campaigns:
“encompass a wide and indefinite range o f legal and potentially illegal tactics
used by unions to exert pressure on an employer. These tactics may include, but
are not limited to, legal actions, political appeals, requests that regulatory agencies
investigate and pursue employer violations o f state or federal law, and negative
publicity campaigns aimed at reducing the employer’s good will with employees,
investors, or the general public” {Diamond Walnut Growers v. NLRB 1997 and
Food Lion v. United Food& Commercial Workers International Union 1997).
This relatively new description o f union tactics under an expanded definition o f a
corporate campaign signifies that changes in union strategy and application have
transpired. What was once thought to be an alternative response to a hostile union
environment has become a broader classification, including added non-traditional and
sometimes illegal measures. The explanation also provides a definitive range o f tactics,
giving better indicators as to what ‘pressuring’ a company entails. This assessment
provides more insight into the term than the one provided by the AFL-CIO.
There is a distinct difference among scholars and unions about what common goals
and tactics are features o f corporate campaigns. This definition challenge has resulted in a
lack o f generalizable applicability o f their findings pertaining to case comparisons across

11
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different studies and confusion about what constitutes a corporate campaign in cases that
are more recent.
Based upon this review o f the literature, a reasonable definition o f corporate
campaigns is actions, either legal or illegal, that unions use in an effort to force an
employer to make concessions. Actions, according to this definition include the following
elements; litigation, coalition building, pressuring the company’s financial associates, onjob actions, exerting pressure on government officials, efforts to compel regulatory
agencies investigations o f businesses breaches o f law, and negative publicity campaigns.
The inclusion o f the range o f tactics provides an improved definition o f corporate
campaigns.
Litigation generally refers to charges filed by the union against a company. These
grievances are filed with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and accuse the
company o f particular violations o f labor law. Examples o f such alleged violations are
wrongful termination or demotion, management interference with employees’ rights to
organize labor unions, or management retaliation towards individuals involved in union
organization. Court procedures, or the threat thereof, may operate to persuade the
company to seek a mutually beneficial end to the conflict. This tactic tends to be a time
consuming endeavor; the courts are not generally known for their efficiency and brevity.
It also has the potential to be costly for both parties.
A second, commonly used action is coalition building. This occurs when a union, in
efforts to force business to negotiate, will attempt to find sympathetic individuals or
organizations to help support and promote their cause. Potential partners may be religious
groups, other unions and locals, and/or public figures. Coalitions increase the scope o f the

12
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conflict to draw in numerous interested parties who may in turn, help to raise exposure o f
the issue to a wider audience, or pressure the company to engage in discussion.
Pressuring the company’s financial associates is a third strategy. Financial associates
may be lenders, pecuniary institutions, boards o f directors, or investors who may be
instrumental in bringing management to the bargaining table. Some events staged in this
category are picketing, protest, letter writing, and boycotts. These actions may affect the
company’s bottom-line, as with boycotts, or lead to coalition building, for instance with
an individual on the board o f directors.
On-job actions are the fourth approach corporate campaign strategies. These ‘actions’
may consist o f sickouts (the majority o f workers call in sick on a given day), wildcat
strikes (unauthorized and unexpected strikes lasting from a couple hours to a few days),
work slowdowns, wearing union apparel while working, and lunchtime rallies. The
aforementioned are similar to boycotts in their possible effects, in terms o f lessening
company productivity, subsequently cutting into its bottom-line.
Another tactic that is akin to pressuring financial associates is exerting influence on
government officials. This is a way for unions to build alliances with elected officials or
people in government institutions. Relationships are fostered in order to influence
legislation or to press officials to bring business into negotiations.
Additional approaches are efforts to compel regulatory agencies investigations of
businesses breaches o f law. A union will file a complaint with Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) asserting that workers are at risk in the workplace. They
may also bring accusations against the company to the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). These normally charge that management are ‘environmental criminals’ who

13
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violate environmental regulations (Northrup and Steen 1999). Another agency avenue
used is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), with the purpose o f bringing to
the surface complaints questioning a company’s financial records. The above-mentioned
agencies are consequently compelled to investigate allegations against the company.
Scrutiny o f a business may affect productivity, result in drawn out litigation, sometimes
generate fines, or perhaps damage the company’s reputation when the findings are
released.
A final tactic in a union’s arsenal is negative publicity campaigns. These campaigns
are conducted against a business in order to mar public perception. Byproducts o f
negative publicity may be increased community support for their effort or the forging o f
new alliances with other groups who are sympathetic. It might spur product boycotts.
This action, like all the other tactics, is executed in hopes o f expediting a settlement.
Corporate campaigns are pursued in three distinct labor action contexts that are
originate from Paul Jarley and Cheryl M aranto’s research. The first situation is the
‘organizing campaigns.’ Operations within this scenario target,
“a company's employees for (union) membership which generally culminates into
an election conducted by the National Labor Relations Board after an intense
campaign effort” (Greaves 1999, p .l).
It is anticipated that employees will gain union representation from this type o f campaign
(Jarley and Maranto 1990).
The second circumstance is the ‘strike complement’ campaign. This is defined as
unions using corporate campaign tactics while simultaneously engaged in a strike or

14
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subject to a lockout (Jarley and Maranto 1990). This endeavor is typically carried out to
resolve contract disputes and issues involving working conditions and safety.
The third and final context in which corporate campaign actions generally occur are
during ‘strike substitute’ campaigns (Jarley and Maranto 1990). Strike substitute
campaigns are characterized by actions other than strikes or lockouts (when a business
refuses to allow their employees into the workplace) that disrupt production and/or makes
the worker and employer relationship difficult (Bne.îAmicus Curiae o f LPA, Inc. 2000).

Research Designs and Conclusions o f Prior Studies
The past approaches used to explore corporate campaigns have been qualitative,
concentrating on only a handful o f cases occurring in the 1970s and 1980s. As previously
stated in Chapter one, there have been few studies dealing with corporate campaigns and
even fewer questioning their effectiveness. Most researchers mention the general concept
o f corporate campaigns within the large framework o f labor history, as with Charles
Heckscher’s writings, as opposed to a small number o f scholars who have analyzed
specific cases in which a campaign occurred. A definite limitation to studies on the
subject is that cases included in most studies were only those that gained media attention,
such as the J.P. Stevens, Litton, and Louisiana-Pacific campaigns (Jarley and Maranto
1990; Moody 1988). Unfortunately, this leads to a potential conclusion that the research
may have been subject to selection bias, because a prerequisite for inclusion into studies
was that the case had to be high profile. Consequently, cases involving few workers
and/or those receiving little media attention tended to be left out.

15
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Two studies are particularly noteworthy because they present the most extensive
analysis o f corporate campaigns. The first is Charles Perry’s study, which was a
qualitative analysis o f the definition o f corporate campaign, strategies and tactics, and
contexts. His descriptions o f union tactics and accounts o f the cases provided the
benchmark for other researchers on the issue. It was the earliest in-depth explorations of
the practical application o f non-traditional methods. Perry surveyed ten campaigns, most
o f which were also later explored by Jarley, Maranto, and Moody. He found that
corporate campaigns “produced few, if any, ‘victories’ for those conducting the
campaigns” (Perry 1987, p. 123).
The second most influential study was Jarley and Maranto’s (1990) work. They also
engaged in qualitative analysis, but studied a larger number o f cases, 28 total.
Unfortunately, for the purposes o f this study, their case evaluations only extend to 1988.
Furthermore, their study does not examine other characteristics and outcomes, such as the
use o f illegal or questionable tactics. On the other hand, Jarley and Maranto (1990) did
assess the influence o f specific tactics on whether or not they encouraged management to
enter into negotiations with a union. The examination additionally provided basic
contexts in which to evaluate corporate campaign successes and failures. The labor
conflict environments in which they categorized corporate campaigns were strike
complement, strike substitute, and organizing campaigns.
The first circumstances explored were strike complement campaigns. These types of
campaigns had the highest failure rates and were found to be the most disastrous for
winning concessions, primarily because workers were already using their most influential
tool, the strike. Strikes are generally a last ditch effort; therefore, initializing a corporate

16
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campaign when workers are already striking may result in negating the advantages o f
both. Jarley and Maranto analyzed nine cases o f corporate campaigns undertaken after
strikes or lockouts had been initiated; all except for two are categorized as failures.
The second context evaluated in the study was the strike substitute campaign. Tactics
characteristic in this type of have the potential to interfere with the company’s bottom
line. An example o f this approach is workers refusing overtime hours leading to reduced
production. In Jarley and Maranto’s case studies, they found only one strike substitute
case. International Paper I., which achieved a clear victory resulting in sizable contract
gains (Jarley and Maranto 1990).
The third labor contexts examined were organizing campaigns. These actions focus
on initially establishing union representation and first contracts. Out o f the 28 cases
observed, nine cases were organizing campaigns, o f those; five achieved their goal o f
obtaining union representation and a first contract. Jarley and Maranto’s conclusions state
that the best scenario for conducting a corporate campaign and securing external support
is “when they (corporate campaigns) complement traditional organizing drives” (Jarley
and Maranto 1990, p.513).
Aside from the influential studies conducted by Perry, Jarley and Maranto, Moody
also weighs in with an assessment o f corporate campaigns. Moody’s early studies were
also diverse in terms o f union’s effectiveness in achieving desired outcomes. Moody’s
analysis primarily identifies the origins o f corporate campaigns, but does not conduct an
extensive multi-case study. However, the research revealed that timing, organization, the
ability to mobilize the mass public and workers, and the external environment, are all
direct contributors to the success or failure o f the campaigns (Moody 1988).
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Jarley and Maranto agree with Moody’s emphasis o f timing, organization, the ability
to mobilize, and external environment as eoncrete variables effecting campaign
outcomes. Despite pointing to these considerations as issues for union management to
broach before engaging in eorporate campaigns, none o f the authors attributes settlements
or negotiations to the use o f a partieular taetic pertaining to the previously diseussed
features.
Nonetheless, it could be asserted that the timing o f a campaign could be advantageous
for a union if a company is susceptible to on-job actions, boycotts, and negative publicity
campaigns. Conversely, attacking a company in order to interfere with profit and
production when it is finaneially precarious is risky; actions may prompt management to
bargain, but they could also push the business into insolveney.
Union density and state right to work laws, may effeet organization; fewer members
might result in less exercisable leverage and resources available for a waging a eampaign
against a company. Tactics that may be more difficult to undertake in these eircumstances
are negative publicity campaigns and litigation, both are costly, and protests and
boycotts, which require mass partieipation. O f course, union density and right to work
laws may also weaken the ability for union mobilization as a consequenee o f low
membership rates.
Tactics employed by labor may vary depending on the state o f the external
environment. Unions, according to the authors, must consider the whether or not there
will be hostility or sympathy towards their cause and prevalent économie conditions
when attempting to elicit either public support or widespread worker involvement. For
instance, if a campaign is initiated during a recession, which causes an uncertain
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economic environment for business, unions may have difficulties conducting on-job
actions or building industry-wide coalitions due to workers fears o f losing their jobs.
Recession m ay hinder overall mobilization as well due to potential job loss.
Other concerns influencing organization and corporate campaign outcomes are
flexibility in union action and structure when engaged in labor conflict. In the literature,
Jarley, Maranto, and Moody posited that groups that are better organized and struetured
may possess a greater ability to reeruit and retain members and acquire resources.
Subsequently, well-structured unions are adept at applying corporate campaign strategies
that target company’s weak points and producing union gains. These types o f groups
additionally engage in self-preservation and more rational resource spending, lending to
both longevity o f the organization and its ability to undertake extended campaigns and
expensive tactics. Moreover, highly organized unions may have established methods o f
fundraising, or reciprocal relationships with other groups, the government, and public
officials. These ideas effecting group organization will be explored further in this chapter.
An overview o f the literature exposes that no researchers has yet included a large
enough sample size to draw significant conclusions on whether or not corporate
campaigns work. This will most likely occur in the future when the amount o f campaigns
conducted would warrant a quantitative analysis. There is also an absence o f systematic
data, because most scholars used content analysis, or gained their data on specific
campaigns through direct observation and interviews.
Another conclusion that may be drawn from the limited amount o f literature is that
corporate campaigns are not a hard and fast solution to labor conflicts. According to the
authors, corporate campaigns may force public attention to certain aspects o f the conflict.
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or serve to force management to the bargaining table, but they do not guarantee positive
outcomes for union demands.

Resource Mobilization Theory and Labor
Literature relating to corporate eampaigns does not thoroughly explain the dynamics
o f how campaigns operate to further the labor movement or soeial movements as a
whole. Resource mobilization theory is employed for the purposes o f this study to explain
how groups exercise power to achieve their goals, specifically, how United States labor
associations organize and pool influence to achieve concessions from business. Resource
mobilization theory is defined as collective interests uniting and exerting their shared
resources in order to achieve specific ends (Jenkins 1983).
Resource mobilization theory posits that individuals engage in collective behavior in
order to exert pressure not only on government, but on business as well. The theory is a
framework that lends structure to the analysis o f how eitizen groups, who do not have
vast coffers or legion numbers, influenee government and big business. Extracting
concessions from powerful entities is not generally guaranteed by mobilization efforts,
sometimes groups are successful, often times not. Business may have the ability to
withstand or strike back against union attacks due to a secure financial position, durable
produetion and sales, or resilient business relationships with investors, suppliers, and
vendors. Achieving, or the failure to gain eoncessions are aptly explained by resource
mobilization theory, explaining the ideal components indispensable in gaining labor
movement momentum and support— inereasing both membership and resourees.
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Resource Mobilization Theory: Assumptions
Pluralism and rational choice theories appear to be the origins from which major
tenets o f resource mobilization evolved; although, they are not explicitly cited by Jenkins
as directly contributing to the structure o f the theory and are, in sum, separate theoretieal
frameworks. The first possible component o f resource mobilization theory rest in
assoeiations proposed by Dahl, Radcliff and Saiz, whose ideas suggest that the theory
may be pluralistic in nature; suecess is attributable to the force o f interest groups (Dahl
1978; Radcliff and Saiz 1998). Pluralism underlies how policies are formed in
government. The theory also states that groups, not individuals, govern the country. This
results in government deeisions that are created through competition between interested
parties, not necessarily voted on by individual citizens (Dahl 1978). Multiple points o f
aecess (voting, lobbying, federalism, running for political office) into Ameriean
government gives interest groups avenues through which they may influence and
sometimes, even create public policy and laws. Radcliff and Saiz posited that higher
membership numbers within a group might translate into increased political power in the
form of potential votes. These votes ultimately yield a transformation o f grievances and
group unity into leverage (Radcliff and Saiz 1998). Interest group power is wielded to
gain legislation, financial resources, concessions from business, hearings in a court o f
law, or any number o f other considerations from public officials, government, and
corporations (Radcliff and Saiz 1998). Furthermore, in the case o f labor, solidarity or
group power, may inerease the effectiveness o f eorporate campaign tactics such as
increasing the number o f people involved in boycott efforts, on-job actions, and protests,
whereby threatening business’ lines o f production or endanger revenue.
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Schattschneider provides another point regarding interest group power and its ability
to achieve positive outcomes. He views interest group conflicts as having two potential
sets o f players, “the few individuals who are actively engaged at the center...and the
audience that is irresistibly attracted to the scene” (Schattschneider 1960, p.2). The
audience may consist o f individuals on the peripheral o f the conflict, for example,
families and friends o f union members, or those who are not directly associated with the
clash, such as religious and community organizations and people who have an interest,
but are wholly unaffiliated. When the combatants at the center o f the dispute are not
equal in terms o f the power that they are able to wield in order to win the battle, the ones
in danger o f losing will employ the second set o f players, the audience (Schattschneider
1960). Schattschneider additionally adds “ ...the outcome o f every conflict is determined
by the extent to which the audience becomes involved in it” (Schattschneider 1960, p.2).
Bearing this in mind, whichever party succeeds in eliciting public sympathies and support
is able to block their opponent from doing so, subsequently maintaining control over the
conflict and outcome (Schattschneider 1960). Labor may not choose to enlarge a conflict
into the public realm if they perceive mass sympathies favoring business’ side o f the
issue or if they regard themselves as already having the upper hand in the battle.
Mancur Olson clarifies factors regarding group power and the mechanics o f social
movements. He characterized them as relating to rational choice theory. Rational choice
asserts that individuals are rational and as a result will make choiees in order to maximize
the prospects o f their aehieving personal benefits or goals. This idea directly relates to
how workers seek to maximize their incomes, for instance through career choices or
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union membership, and how business owners act to maximize profits, perhaps through
diversifying production lines and increasing or decreasing their workforce.
Olson additionally presented the idea o f ‘selective benefits,’ referring to them as key
in entieing people’s participation in movements outside o f structured democratic
institutions (Olson 1968). ‘Selective benefits’ are potential perks an individual may
receive, whereby operating to induce group membership, as opposed to a public good,
which everyone enjoys. For instance, membership in a union may provide an individual
with representation that will negotiate for the member to reeeive higher pay. Selective
benefits are also enjoyed by individuals who do not pursue membership; they are referred
to as ‘free-riders.’ Free riders do not pay dues, nor do they join in group action, however,
they may only benefit after benefits have beeome institutionalized, whereby becoming a
norm.
This explanation o f why individuals engage in organization membership is a
prerequisite for understanding the underpinnings o f resource mobilization theory. The
perception o f potential benefits, whether symbolie or material, as rewards for interest
group partieipation is the most compelling impetus for individual’s seeking union
membership and partieipating in mobilization.
From Olson’s perspective, partieipation in the labor movement is expected to
surrender individual level gains and possibly result in a more symbolie, long-term goal o f
establishing an industrial demoeracy. However, Olson also states that members o f
organizations may not be equally motivated to pursue their common interest, or may not
have joined the group to pursue the same interest, although the group, overall, exists to
further common goals. His assertions, subsequently, bring to light the inadequacies o f

23

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

resource mobilization theory: an individual’s behavior, motivation, or aetions may not
always adhere to group agendas and ideals.
John Frey’s position is consistent with Olson on the importance o f selective
incentives. He additionally posited a similar need for an industrial demoeracy. According
to Frey, one o f the four selective benefits offered by union enrollment and the pursuit o f
an industrial democracy was the ability to determine conditions o f employment (Frey
1918). Second, employees must be provided with decent working conditions (Frey
1918). Third, was the stipulation that workers must be afforded the same rights as
employers; employees should not be second-class or subservient (Frey 1918). The fourth
and most important tenet o f U.S. union membership encompasses the policy o f seeking
increased wage benefits. Higher pay permits workers to enjoy higher standards o f living.
Elevated quality o f life serves to improve citizen’s physical, mental and moral conditions
(Frey 1918). The ability to negotiate egalitarian ends relies heavily on the power o f a
group to mobilize. Frey’s assessment o f labor goals demonstrates the aptitude o f both
‘selective benefits’ and resource mobilization theory in explaining the dynamics o f these
phenomena.
Even though resource mobilization theory is defined as colleetive interests uniting
and exerting their shared resources in order to achieve spécifié ends, it is also apparent
that it has other broader theoretieal components as well (Jenkins 1983). The theory is
ultimately a synthesis o f interest group strength— namely the mechanisms articulated by
pluralism and rational choiee theory, resulting in union membership prompted by the
enticements o f potential seleetive benefits (Dahl and Olson).
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Group Structure and Resource Mobilization Theory
Group structure, as previously mentioned in terms o f its effects on corporate
campaign outcomes, is another component o f resouree mobilization theory. Even though
group formation, stability, and sustenance may lie outside o f normal political and
economic institutions, does not mean that interest groups, social movements, or unions
lack structure (Ruhin 1986). The argument, however, is whether a ‘top-down’, ‘bottomup’, or an ‘integrated approaeh’ to organizational strueture best aehieves positive
outcomes through the application o f unified leverage. Top-down struetures only give
those at the top o f the organizational hierarchy the authority to implement strategies.
Bottom-up decision making empowers people in the grassroots ranks. An integrated
approach allows for decisions to be made and actions undertaken at all levels.
The theory acknowledges that increasing levels o f bureaucracy and financial supports
within union organizations have helped to establish firm, yet flexible structures o f
leadership. These elements fuse together, in a top-down structure, in order to increase the
likelihood o f goal attainment (Rubin 1986). Rubin asserted that institutionalization o f a
movement increases the ability o f worker militancy—resulting in, for instanee, the
increased capability to strike successfully (Rubin 1986).
Existing in the literature is a disagreement in terms o f the meaning o f worker
militancy. Its characterization has been subjected to definitions beyond the classification
o f the strike, stretched to encompass radicalism. Labor radicalism may be defined as an
interest in inducing sweeping societal and politieal changes that may subvert mainstream
economic and political structures (Aronowitz 1983). A symptom o f this reclassifieation
was that some government offieials and the public viewed the concept o f worker rights
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and the labor movement as akin to communist or socialist movements (Taft 1948). Taft
remedied this misconception by clarifying that labor movement concerns are primarily
focused on improving the member’s work conditions and wages. He additionally argued
that labor is too pragmatie, primarily concerned with wages and eonditions, to collaborate
with, or be used by any group that may hinder these objectives. Taft also stressed that the
communist or socialist agendas sit in stark opposition to union priorities. Unions seek
increases in the wealth o f its members, whereas, communists and socialists seek equality
o f wealth for society as a whole. (Taft 1948) Bearing the previously stated in mind, it is
conceivable that Taft shares Rubin’s view that unions are rational, structured and
bureaueratic, not a radical movement seeking the overthrow o f économie and
governmental entities.
There is also some dissent regarding the effectiveness o f bureaucratic institutionalized
unions and social movement structures. Milkman elaborated upon this point by citing the
composition o f the Ameriean Federation o f Labor-Congress o f Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO), claiming that it is plagued by internal bureaueratic inertia. She viewed its
strueture and bureaucracy, which were favored by Taft and Rubin, as obstaeles to
success; claiming that both play a part in reducing confrontational actions (Milkman
1998). Milkman also suggested that movement goals are better achieved when carried out
at the grassroots level, through a bottom-up structure, by more radical leadership and
flexible activist-type tactics.
The eurrent literature on resouree mobilization theory provides no definitive
agreement as to whether structure, or laek thereof, is conducive to mass mobilization and
interest group formation. Milkman offers an assessment o f how resource mobilization
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functions better at the grassroots level, as opposed to receiving top-down instructions.
This is especially important in terms o f conducting a corporate campaign because union
members fighting the battle day-to-day may have a more comprehensive view o f what
strategies or tactics need to be implemented.
An integrated perspective best refleets the organizational structure suggested by the
corporate campaign literature; that a reciprocal structure, top-down and hottom-up, may
operate in synehronicity when clarifying and executing strategies (Rubin 1986). The two
levels o f leadership may both provide the flexibility (locals on the front lines), and
resources (from the nationals), when integrated, allowing for optimum adaptation,
mobilization, and finances with which to confront corporate intractability. Some tactics
included in corporate campaigns rely on front-line mobilization, such as protest, as well
as resourees— financial backing in order to conduct massive negative publicity
campaigns.
Resource mobilization theory presents a key insight into why individuals would opt
for group membership, seleetive benefits. The seleetive benefits a union member would
receive are the fruits o f the collective bargaining processes— increases in wages and
benefits, which are the primary inducements for participation. Additionally it explains
how groups use their influence to alter policy outcomes and lawmaking. This leverage is
similarly wielded when conducting corporate eampaigns; however, it is applied not only
to government, but to financial associates and potential consumers as well. The theory
also points to interest group power and its possible mobilization in the sphere o f the labor
movement, suggesting the labor movement must increase its membership, resources, and
spearhead an integrated approach to action and organization. Considerations producing
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flexible organizational struetures, efforts to increase member motivation (i.e. frequent
aceomplishments o f positive outcomes for contracts), and prospective resources within
the context o f a corporate campaign may provide the foundation for substantial positive
changes and expansion o f the labor movement.
The theory also leads to the expectation that unions, regardless o f strueture, that
conduct corporate campaigns, will unify, mobilize, and use tactics that target a
company’s ability to maximize its profits for the end result o f achieving improvements
for their own wages, benefits and/or conditions. Additionally anticipated is that business
will seek to maximize ineome as well, whereby ereating conflicts that are decided by how
each exercises their power and exploits their resources. Resource mobilization theory
accounts for the power o f union solidarity and an ability to engage in this battle, through
its tenets that groups make use o f their resources in order to obtain shared goals.
Resource mobilization theory also points to aceompanying tactics that may best
achieve coneessions from business. These include boycotts, pressure on investors,
prompting regulatory agency investigations, influencing financial associates, on-job
actions, and litigation. The effectiveness o f these tacties is reinforced by the strength of
group alliance and their capability to engage in collective actions that most directly
endanger a company’s profits. However, as mentioned before, companies are also selfinterested and sometimes have the means to combat attacks on investments, revenue, and
production. For example, a company may be able to take advantage o f a union’s laek of
timing, solidarity, and ability to mobilize. The external environment, in regards to a
state’s dwindled union density or right to work laws may also eonstrain the ability for
unions to gain the leverage needed to achieve sought after concessions.
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CHAPTER 3

ECONOMIC CONTEXT
In the last fifteen years, the United States eeonomie environment has been through
changes that may account for labor’s push towards corporate campaigns. Jarley and
Maranto concur, also concluding in an earlier study that the external environment may
enable a corporate campaign to succeed (Jarley and Maranto 1990). However, the
external economic environment and hostile business praetiees have created the need for
such bold tactics, despite the risk o f uncertain outcomes.

The Wage Gap
Perhaps one o f the main threats contributing to the adoption o f harsher union
movement tactics is the increasing wage gap between the rich and poor. This perception
may not be unwarranted when considering that economic inequality might lead to class
divisions (Neufeld 1982). Labor mobilization may be a reasonable reaction to these
inequities. Corporate campaigns are used by unions in an attempt to prompt wealth
redistribution.
The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) offers evidence o f the growing wage gap. The
research indicates that in 2003 the wages o f the top one percent o f United States
households had risen by 184 percent since 1982 and that they also controlled one-third o f
total U.S. wealth (Price 2004). By comparison, middle-class household incomes had
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increased 12.5 percent and those inhabiting the lowest wage scales only experienced a
six and a half pereent gain in the same 21-year span (Price 2004). These figures are
startling, considering the economy has been steadily growing and productivity has been
increasing.
“Over the last three years (from 2001 through 2004), corporate profits in the
United States have expanded by 57.5%, while private wage and salary income has
actually decreased by 1.7% over the same period” (Price 2004).
Moreover, the data indicate that there has been limited redistribution o f wealth,
which in turn, supports Neufeld’s apprehensions that the rieh may become economically
dominant at the expense o f workers.

The Decline o f the Real Wage
Another issue that exacerbates wage inequities is the steady decreases in the ‘real
wage.’ Real wage is defined as “the average wage adjusted for changes in the priees o f
consumer goods” (Eeonomies Glossary). This situation is also referred to as ‘wage
stagnation.’ Declines in the real wage place downward pressures on ineomes that are
already insuffieient to cover escalations in the cost o f living and inflation. Daily expenses
for Amerieans have been steadily increasing in the last five years and have risen from 20
percent to 30 percent between 2002 and 2004 (Labor Research Association 2004). Three
necessities that have become more expensive are housing, healthcare, and energy. Higher
energy eosts translate into upsurges in overall consumer prices (Oliphant 2005).
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Figure 3.1: Decline o f the Real Wage: 1970-2004
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Data in the figure show the decline in real average weekly earnings, particularly from
1978 to i992. Although real wages increased during the 1990s, the data show virtually no
growth since the year 2000.
In order to place this in perspective consider the federal poverty standard. This
standard establishes the minimum necessary earnings for purchasing food, clothing, and
housing at $17,650 in order to be classified as earning above poverty level wages for a
family o f four in 2001 (American City Business Journals Inc. 2001). By comparison,
average yearly earnings for United States households overall according to the United
States Census Bureau was $43,318 in 2003.
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Overall, the U.S. Bureau o f Labor Statistics data presented in the graph indicate that
there has been a decline o f almost 13 percent from 1970 until 2004 (BLS). Since the Civil
War, workers in the Unites States have had their average wages double every 36 years
until 1973 (Mishel 1996; Bernstein, Jared and Schmitt 1996).
This decline in the average real wage has a negative relationship to the wages o f the
top one percent o f United States households, which have experienced astronomical gains,
during a time in which regular Americans have had insubstantial growth in their overall
share o f income.
Wage disparity has been a rallying cry o f the labor movement. National unions, such
as the AFL-CIO have formed coalitions with community organizations, the most
dominant o f which is the Association o f Community Organizations for Reform Now
(ACORN), to institute legislation adopting area-wide living wages. Another front on
which this problem has been met head on has been through federal level appeals from
unions as well as humanitarian groups seeking to raise the national minimum wage,
which, as o f 2005, is five dollars and fifteen cents an hour. Roughly, 10 million
Americans are currently earning minimum wage (Chasanov 2004). According to
Chasanov, a researcher for the Economic Policy Institute, this rate is still roughly $1,800
below the poverty line for a family o f two (Chasanov 2004).
A third resolution to solve the problem o f wage inequities has been suggested by pro
labor groups. They recommend establishing a yearly-adjusted minimum wage that would
be based on the Consumer Price Index, whereby directly correlating wages with costs o f
living. Unfortunately, few o f these efforts have been successful. A dominant reason for
wage inertia may be the failure o f American workers to mobilize on this issue and
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pressure for widely adopted policies affecting the real wage. It may also be the result o f
diminished labor movement power, which would explain why some unions have turned
to aggressive corporate campaigns to enhance pay rates and benefits, rather than rely on
mass public mobilization to achieve legislated wage gains for all workers.

Factors Contributing to Declining Job Security
Business trends and economic conditions facing United States workers that may
additionally increase social inequities, threaten job security, and bring into question union
ability to collectively bargain on a level playing field are increased adoptions o f right-towork laws, recessions, deregulation, corporate re-structuring, outsourcing, industry
competition and industry loss. Job insecurity is a direct factor contributing to employee
and union hesitancy to seek expanded wages and benefits. Business Week stated that,
“Since the 1970s, the risk o f involuntary job loss has soared by 150%” (Colin 2003,
p.22). This has gone up from the 75% risk o f job loss occurring throughout the 1970s.
Perhaps workers’ fears o f job loss due to the previously listed reasons have also given
rise to an environment allowing for the domination o f competitive market powers rather
than concerns for worker equity. These concerns have also been compounded by strides
taken by corporations and government towards a more flexible labor market.
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Right-to-Work Laws
Right-to-work laws are defined as state legislation that makes it illegal for a business
to require employees to join a union; it also prohibits business from denying employment
based on an individual refusing to join a union. Companies that require workers to join a
union in order to obtain employment are referred to as ‘closed shops,’ concurrently, those
that do not impose this requirement are called ‘open shops.’ This legislation originates
from the passage o f the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, which prohibited businesses from
requiring union membership as a requirement for employment. Two types o f shops that
were directly affected by the Act were the ‘closed shop,’ in which workers may only be
hired through a union and the ‘union shop’ which allowed businesses to hire new
employees who did not initially belong to a union, but later required union membership
as a condition o f employment (Legal Database 2005). Passage o f the Taft-Hartley Act
and subsequent right-to-work laws again, leads to a free-rider dilemma, because union
membership and participation are not required, but workers who are not union members
working in a shop that is predominately union still reap the benefits o f membership
without any o f the cost.
Instituting these regulations has been a legislative attempt to create a flexible labor
market. Fallout from these laws is a situation in which employees have difficulties
obtaining wage, benefit and workplace safety improvements due to their subsequent lack
o f organized union representation. Also resulting from these laws is employment with no
predefined contracts, as is inherent in union membership and provided for through
collective bargaining agreements. Contracts entail and protect worker rights. In the
absence o f such agreements, workers are subject to ‘employment at w ill.’ Employment at
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will means that an employee may quit or be terminated without giving or receiving an
explanation as to why (Legal Database 2005). States that have enacted right-to-work laws
include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming (Niznik 2005).
Most o f the abovementioned states are located in the southern and western parts o f the
United States. These areas are commonly characterized by conservative political
leanings, which tend to assert more hard-line anti-union stances.
The AFL-CIO contends that right-to-work laws perpetuate a lower quality o f life for
workers and their families. Some o f their declared consequences o f the legislation include
lower wages, limited healthcare coverage, diminished workplace safety standards,
increases in poverty rates, and lower rates for injured worker’s compensation.
Another intrinsic problem is the ‘free-rider’ issue in the states where the right-to-work
laws are present and union membership is low. In these states, workers benefit from
increased wages in industries where unions have fought to establish work compensation
standards, without paying for the benefits o f group membership, or bearing risk in times
o f union mobilization, for example, during a strike. Free riders and right-to-work laws
may both operate to erode union membership.
Twenty-two out o f the fifty U.S. states now have right-to-work laws. This situation
may have played a role in shrinking union power, by lessening their overall workplace
influence. Unions maintain that these laws are the principal tools exploited by businesses
to carry out union busting. Perhaps in reacting to these new regulations unions have
escalated their use o f corporate campaigns.
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Recessions and Deregulation
Recessions have additionally played a part in diminishing the strength o f the labor
movement and union formation. Unlike right-to-work laws, recessions are an
unforeseeable external environmental factor. Recessions are defined as a decline in the
economy, more specifically, a decline in the gross domestic product (GDP) for six
months or more (Wikipedia.org). There have been two recessions that have occurred
within the scope of this study. The first ran from 1990 through 1991. The second
economic down turn began in 2001 and ended in 2003 (Department o f Commerce,
Bureau o f Economic Analysis).The results for labor that stem from recessions are job
losses, reduced job growth, halts in wage and benefit expansions, declines in the real
wage, and increased poverty rates.
The effects o f recession on collective bargaining are potentially disastrous. Unions
have difficulties negotiating for increases in pay and benefits when profits are
deteriorating. Generally, contract talks focus on retaining current pay and entitlements
when the economy drops off. During these times, unions must turn to alternative forms o f
coercion, namely corporate campaigns, which do not focus on eliciting equity in terms
profit redistribution from the employer, but instead focus on ‘by any means necessary’
strategies to gain improvements for their members’ contracts.
Another dilemma present during economic hard times is difficulties conducting
organizing drives during periods o f increased competitiveness in a tight labor market.
People will tend towards maintaining the status quo within the workplace, rather than
rock the boat and endanger their jobs.
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Deregulation is an additionally factor that has placed new pressures on unions,
becoming a predominant trend during the 1980s and 1990s. The consequences o f
deregulation resonate through the United States economy today. Deregulation is defined
as when government abolishes restraints on business. The justification given for
eliminating regulations is that the market will be able to operate in a more laissez-faire
manner, increasing both competitiveness and efficiency, cumulating in cheaper goods for
consumers and higher profits for business (Wikipedia.org).
Despite the gains assured by proponents o f unbridled industries, the impact that it has
had on labor has been substantial. Reduced government regulation o f industries has led to
uncontrolled market forces. Deregulation has had a domino effect on working people;
downsizing, job instability, downward pressures on wages and benefits, and reduced
union membership in the workplace (AFL-CIO. Retrieved: 7 Feb. 2006.
http://www.aflcio.orgL Unrestrained markets are beholden to no one. In turn, profit
margins become the primary motivator, not the overall health o f the economy. Another
consequence is instead o f creating freer and expanded markets; deregulation has created
monopolies, as with news media consolidations and mass communications industry
mergers (AFL-CIO. Retrieved: 7 Feb. 2006. http://www.aflcio.orgL Deregulation’s most
damaging effect is that it ultimately prevents the government from stepping in to shape
and stabilize the economy and force better economic outcomes for its citizens (AFL-CIO.
Retrieved: 7 Feb. 2006. http://www.aflcio.org).
Unregulated industries have become a bane to union negotiations and organizing for
the same reasons that recessions make it problematic; job instability prevents workers
from being bold about pursuing better contracts and organizing. Hands-off practices by
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government that allow companies to go unchecked have also antagonized unions into
adopt corporate campaign’s aggressive tactics.

Mass Layoffs
Deregulation and recessions are only two factors that play a role in job loss. A third is
mass layoffs, which are the worst-case outcomes o f job insecurity. Findlaw.com defines
mass layoffs as a “layoff affecting: (1) at least 33% o f active full-time employees and at
least 50 full-time employees, or (2) 500 full-time employees.” This type o f massive job
loss has become more prevalent because some companies implement strategies to
decrease labor and materials costs. Methods used to achieve higher profits and
productivity, while simultaneously decreasing expenditures, are outsourcing and
company reorganization (sometimes referred to as ‘downsizing’). There are other reasons
offered by corporations for eliminating employees, such as import competition, however,
those will be explored later in this chapter.
The table below is a sample o f industries derived from the United State’s Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS). The data represent broad headings for the most common sectors
providing employment in the economy. The numbers available used are from 1996
through 2004. Prior periods are not included, because the figures represent an ample
amount o f the timeline examined in this particular study. Two o f the main industry
headings were not incorporated o f the table. The first was ‘information,’ because most o f
the jobs presented could also be included category ‘professional and technical.’
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Table 3.] : Mass Layoffs by Industry
Year
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1
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350784

116236

43159

26054

36233

45781

1216

619463

323531

95635

58220

33397

33702

49391

2077

595953

469069

58969

56733

21920

31109

47832

2403

688035

356112

91519

49966

24304

35107

38610

3227

598845

366070

88134

50030

22222

38669

41035

3371

609531

627930

131974

117192

51218

23792

79687

2697

1034490

454034

135679

82065

57907

30148

50362

5488

815683

384329

127235

87918

40252

32518

53215

2644

728111

254430

143670

59098

33199

44213

68855

4966

608431

3586289

989051

604381

310473

305491

474768

28089

6298542

1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

2003
2004
Total
* Totals are for all states and represent the amount o f workers separated from their jobs
for each industry. Criteria for inclusion are at least 50 unemployment insurance claims
from a single establishment within a five-week period.
Source: Bureau o f Labor Statistics
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv
11/8/05

Analyzing the ‘information’ industry would have been redundant in light o f the
availability o f this more extensive category. The second excluded sector was entitled
‘personal and laundry.’ These industries were not integrated into the table because they
are also encompassed by the categories ‘retail,’ ‘healthcare and social assistance,’ and
‘hotel and food.’
The main finding from this table is that the highest numbers o f massive layoffs,
3,586,289 occurred in the manufacturing industry. This number was expected because of

39

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

increases in outsourcing, imports, and foreign competition throughout the 1990s to the
present (Kletzer 2005). The worst year for manufacturing job loss was 2001, due to the
recession. Total employed, as a percent o f United States population, in the manufacturing
sector, according to the International Labour Organization (ILO), was 17 percent in 1990.
By 2001, that percentage had dropped to roughly 14 percent. Another, similar figure firom
the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR), posits that between 1991 and
2003,17 percent to 26 percent o f all manufacturing workers were displaced. This
scenario is not simply due to a downfall or changes in market demands because,
“U.S. consumers and businesses have not shifted their purchasing away from
manufactured goods. In fact, demand for manufactured goods as a share o f total
demand in the United States has actually grown over the past 10 years” (Bivens
2004, p. 1).
Another point o f interest provided by the figures is that onsite repair and maintenance
experienced the fewest layoffs. This finding was also anticipated because o f the nature
and stability o f the work. These jobs are ‘place specific,’ meaning that they are orientated
towards working on and maintaining immovable structures, therefore, these fields are not
endangered by off-shoring or import competition. However, they are not immune from
displacement, company reorganization and ownership changes will sometimes produce
job losses.
The most surprising finding was that the retail sector experienced the second highest
rate o f layoffs, because this type o f work is not generally endangered by off shoring or
import competition. Consumer spending has held steady at the rate o f 75 percent o f the
United States yearly gross domestic product (GDP). This number, as indicated by yearly
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increases in the GDP, has been steadily growing throughout the last decade and a half, so
it was puzzling that there would be substantial layoffs in the retail industry. However, it
also bears mentioning that these layoff figures paled in comparison to overall
manufacturing job losses.
According to the data, service sector employment in 1990 accounted for 27 million
jobs, compared to manufacturing, which totaled 18 million. In 2000, the service sector
provided 39 million jobs, compared again to manufacturing, which roughly held fast at
18 million (BLS 2004). These numbers draw attention to the U.S. economy’s move to a
service-orientated workforce; they also demonstrate that although retail employment may
be constant, it is susceptible to job insecurity.
Economists propose that layoffs also may be attributable to severe drops in global
capital investments into the United States economy (Congressional Budget Office 2004).
For example, in 2000, global investments into the U.S. markets stood at $314 billion.
Three years later, funds invested had fallen by $16 billion. Capital investment creates
more industry and subsequently more jobs, therefore these downturns in foreign interests
may continue to impact job markets in the future. Another observer suggested that the
obstacle to retaining employment is diminishing exports, as exemplified by the U.S. trade
deficit (The McKinsey Quarterly 2005).
These issues may coalesce to create an unstable economy that presents limited
opportunities for job security and job creation. Labor unions, in the face o f this have
become compelled to use corporate campaigns in order to bring attention to these
challenges.
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As previously mentioned, outsourcing, company reorganization, and import
competition result in job eliminations, however, business ownership change is yet another
reason given by employers for these layoffs.
Seen in the table below are data indicating an overall job loss for eight-years at
approximately 1.56 million broken down by reasons given for layoffs. The sample
represents all reasons given by corporations for mass layoffs (BLS. Current Employment
Statistics Program 1990-2003).
The main finding from this table is that reorganization within the company was the
primary contributor to mass layoffs. This category may have some data cross-over with
relocation overseas, because the Bureau o f Labor Statistics only documents the initial
reason given for the layoff, not subsequent actions taken (i.e. a company eventually
relocating abroad). Surprisingly, relocations overseas, otherwise known as outsourcing,
came in last. However, U.S. companies have found that they are more globally
competitive and profitable when they incorporate outsourcing as a method for cutting
back labor costs.
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Table 3.2: Reasons Businesses Provided for Mass Layoffs
Business
Relocation Reorganization Import
Total for all
Year
Ownership Overseas
within the
Competition Reasons
Change
Company
(yearly)
48028
4326
118395
13749
184498
1996
24774
10439
80913
12770
128IM6
1997
36569
8797
92956
18473
156795
1998
5683
95122
26684
57306
184795
1999
9054
103120
32908
13416
158498
2000
15693
55387
155691
28008
254779
2001
42867
17075
159852
15350
235144
20M
32640
13205
136904
23734
206483
2003
Total
Layoffs
for each
reason
152184
330479
84272
942953
1509888
(all years)
* Totals are or all states and represent the amount o f workers laid-off from their jobs for
each reason given. Source: Bureau o f Labor Statistics, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv
11/8/05

Company reorganization is carried out with consideration for the bottom-line and/or
to increase production. Ownership change, on the other hand, is normally prompted by
company fears o f falling stock prices or that an impending bankruptcy will Jeopardize the
organization’s continuation. Another reason for a sell-off is the owners may simply want
to divest.
Reorganization may also be the end results o f mergers, acquisitions, and company
sell-offs. According to the data, this appears to be the most significant threat to job
security. Company sell-offs may either entail a complete change in ownership, or the sale
o f pieces, or branches o f the company. Combined numbers o f ownership change and
reorganization equal 1,273,432, which comprises the majority o f mass layoff reasons and
is substantially higher than the overseas relocation amount o f 84,272. However, overseas
relocation may additionally be the result o f ownership change or reorganization. The fact
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that the reasons given by industries for lay offs may be interrelated does pose problems
for exact interpretations o f the data. The task o f assessing the reasons is most accurately
fulfilled through interpreting them by their defined categories.
Import competition produced 67,912 more jobs lost that outsourcing. This figure is
also reflected in the trade deficit, which is now at $66 billion (Isidore 2005), compared to
1992 when the trade gap was at $39 billion. The current imbalance is unprecedented in
U.S. history and when combined with diminished foreign investment and low wage job
creation, these indicate limited expansions o f job opportunities for American workers.
After taking into account these data, perhaps there are additional threats to job
security than the availability o f inexpensive materials and overseas labor. Production
efficiency and cost cutting issues are fundamental factors leading to reorganization and
ownership change. Perhaps the causes that prompt businesses to reduce jobs could be
avoided through implemented strategies o f employee re-training, investments in
innovations and technologies that reflect consumer and market demands, and cuts in
transportation costs by locating production in relation to area market demand. These
suggestions could possibly lead to increased competitiveness and greater job security for
American workers.
External economic factors such as the 32-year fall o f real wages, adoption right-towork laws allowing hiring and firing o f employees at-will, recessions, deregulation, mass
layoffs, company reorganization, outsourcing, and import competition have given rise to
inequalities in wealth ownership. These market dynamics have also disempowered
workers. It has furthermore, created an environment in which U.S. employers are better
able to drive down labor costs. It is difficult develop unified labor movement support for
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the drastic actions necessary to confront these issues in periods characterized by a weak
economy that threatens job security.
Economic uncertainty has negatively influenced on the labor movement momentum.
It is no surprise that union density has fallen drastically since the 1970s, due to such
unbridled and impenetrable market forces.

Falling Union Density
Kate Bronfenbrenner, a prominent scholar on labor issues, asserts when unions have a
resilient presence throughout all sectors they,
“have the power to keep wages up. Each employer is less likely to be undermined
by another employer paying a lower rate. Unions are much more able to get
pattern agreements, and keep the wage rate high” (Multinational Monitor 2003).
The strength o f the unions to expand pay rates and benefits has weakened due to
disappearing union jobs, especially, as mentioned before, in manufacturing. Labor’s
control over terms o f employment is additionally reduced by the looming threat o f long
term employment instability.
Table 3.3 indicates that although numbers for the total workforce steadily grew on a
yearly basis, union membership between 1990 and 2004 dropped an average o f 93,000
every year. Moreover, total numbers for the percentage o f union members employed
between 1990 and 2004 steadily declined at an average o f .25 percent every year.
Bronfenbrenner posits that this deterioration is not only due to outsourcing, as suggested
previously in the context o f mass lay offs, but also because businesses subcontract out
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jobs that union members would typically hold in the company to nonunion facilities
(Multinational Monitor 2003).
Additionally noticeable in Table 3.3 is a drop in those employees peripherally
benefiting from a strong union presence, the ‘free-riders.’ Workers represented by unions,
but who were not members themselves fell and average o f 144,000 per year, or .31
percent. These numbers reveal that the fall in union density may affect the quality o f life
o f those not directly affiliated with, but benefiting from labor alliances.

Table 3.3: Annual Averages o f U.S. Worker Union
Members o f Members of
Year Total
Employed
Unions:
Unions:
Total
Percent o f
Employed
16,776
16.0
104,876
1990
16,612
16.0
1991 103,723
16,418
15.7
104,668
1992
16,627
15.7
1993 106,101
16,748
15.5
1994 107,989
16,360
14.9
110,038
1995
14.5
16;Z69
1996 111,960
14.1
16,110
114,533
1997
16,211
13.9
1998 116,730
16,477
13.9
1999 118,963
13.5
16,258
2000 120,786
16,387
13.4
2001 122,482
16,107
13.2
122,007
2002
15,776
12.9
2003 122,358
15,472
12.5
123,554
2004
(Numbers in thousands)
**self-employed were excluded
Bureau o f Labor Statistics. 11/8/05
http://www.bls.gov/cns/wlf-table38-2005.ndf

Affiliation: 1990-2004
Represented
Represented
by Unions:
by Unions:
Percent o f
Total
Employed
19,105

18.2

18,790

18.1

18,578

17.7

18,682

17.6

18,850

17.5

18,346

16.7

18,158

16.2

17,923

15.6

17,918

15.4

18,182

15.3

17,944

14.9

18,114

14.8

17,771

14.6

17,448

14.3

17,087

13.8

The data again point to the free-rider problem inherent in represented members not
always participating in membership because they already reap benefits. When comparing
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the number o f workers receiving representation ‘by default,’ individuals who are both
members and non members that are covered by contracts, and those who are actually
members, it is apparent that there are a large number o f non-participants figures. Possible
byproducts of the free-rider dilemma are that union morale may suffer, union coffers
diminish, and worker unity, when confronted with adversity, m ay not be durable
(Multinational Monitor 2003).
An issue presented by these numbers is that although the total number o f employed
continually increased overall, union membership and representation steadily fell, with the
most drastic occurrences in 1994, 1995, 2003, and 2004, subsequently taking place after
recessions. The rise o f ‘nonstandard employment’ may be a partial explanation for this
apparent drop in union density. ‘Nonstandard employment’ is defined as individuals who
work part-time, through employment agencies, are on-call, self-employed, or under
contract (Economic Policy Institute 2005). “These jobs typically pay about ten percent
less than their full-time counterparts, and they are much less likely to have benefits such
as health insurance” (Economic Policy Institute 2005, p .l). These temporary jobs are not
generally targets o f union organizers, despite the fact they makeup roughly 30 percent o f
the United States labor market (Baru 2001). In addition to low pay, nonstandard
employment also contributes to job uncertainty and financial insecurity; these
arrangements are not typically protected by retirement benefits, or unemployment and
disability insurance if a worker is laid-off or injured (Baru 2001).
Even with the revitalization o f unionization in the early 1990s, it appears that the
membership numbers do not reflect the supposed reinvigoration o f the movement.
Furthermore, with the ongoing decreases in union membership and presence in the
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workplace, it appears that the 2U ‘ century will not have a re-kindling o f the labor
movement. United States companies are opposed to the perpetuation o f union
membership. Union members earn higher wages and receive better benefits than those
who are nonunion. It could be concluded that this gap is a primary motivator for
businesses to bust unions and in turn, reap the benefits o f cheaper manpower. Union
decline ensures that employers will be able to set lower wages because there will be no
unions to forward collective bargaining agreements, or set standard wages high enough
industry-wide to provide workers with an improved standards o f living.

Union vs. Nonunion Wages
As asserted previously, union density pushes up average wages and benefits. This is
why union membership and organizing drives are fundamental for American workers.
The U.S. Bureau o f Labor Statistics data for 2004 show that union members total
employer compensation (including healthcare, retirement benefits and vacation pay) per
hour was $31.94 (Economic Policy Institute 2005). Nonunion employees received
$22.28 on the average for every hour worked. The most glaring contrast, besides wage,
which for a union member was $22.32 an hour, whereas nonunion wages were $16.21 per
hour, were disparities between the two regarding health insurance and supplemental
retirement benefits received (Economic Policy Institute 2005).
The 2005, BLS survey figures indicate that 92 percent o f union workers have health
insurance, in contrast to the 68 percent o f nonunion (Economic Policy Institute 2005).
Also revealed was that 88 percent o f union members have retirement plans, conversely.
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this benefit is given to 56 percent o f nonunion employees (Economic Policy Institute
2005).
These statistics demonstrate why a union presence in the labor force is not only
important for union participants wage and benefit gains, but also indicate how disparities
are present among nonunion workers as well. Weakened union density throughout the
labor market, resulting in slashed average earnings has not gone unaddressed. Unions are
now looking to organize sectors, which have previously not been focal points for union
density. The primary target for organizing is workers in the service sector, which is
purportedly the new direction in which the American economy is heading. The economic
trend o f strong job numbers for manufacturing and good producing sectors is outdated;
instead, jobs that have the highest rate o f creation and employment growth are located in
service industries. Examples o f these jobs are in the healthcare, technology,
accommodation and food service, and retail industries. Eighty percent o f the United
States workforce is currently employed in the service sector (Wegman and McGee 2004).
These jobs admittedly run the gamut, in terms o f pay and wage compensation; however,
most of the service jobs that created are not typically high paying.
The Bureau o f Labor Statistic data below reflect that service sector dominance o f the
labor market will continue. The figures presented above outline the top ten occupations
that will employ the most workers by 2012 (BLS February 2004 Monthly Labor Review).
There are only two jobs in the table that are classified as having ‘very high’ or ‘high’
income potential. These jobs are postsecondary teachers and truck drivers, however, these
jobs are the bottom two insofar as the amount o f jobs they will create compared to the
other seven.
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Table 3.4: 2012 Projections: Occupations with the Highest Employment
Wages
Total Employed in
Occupation
2 0 1 2 (numbers in
thousands)
4,627
up to $19,600
Retail Salespersons
up to $19,600
3,886
Cashiers
3,301
$19,710 to $27,380
Office Clerks
up
to $19,600
2,908
Registered Nurses
up to $19,600
Janitors and Cleaners (excluding maids 2,681
and housekeepers)
2,464
up to $19,600
Waiters and Waitresses
2,444
up to $19,600
Food Preparation and Serving Workers
2,354
$19,710 to $27,380
Customer Service Representatives
$41,820 and over
2,184
Postsecondary Teachers
2,104
$27,500 to $41,780
Truck Drivers
U.S. Department o f Labor-Bureau o f Labor Statistics.
February 2004 Monthly Labor Review.
http://www.bls.20v/emD/emDtab4.htm

The remaining occupations that will provide employment for the bulk o f American
workers are categorized in the low, or very low pay ranges (BLS February 2004 Monthly
Labor Review). Bear in mind that the 2001 federal poverty standard $17,650 and in 2005
the number has grown to $19,350 for a family o f four (Department o f Health and Human
Services). The aforementioned low paying jobs only provide ‘up to $19,600’ (U.S.
Department o f Labor-Bureau o f Labor Statistics 2004).
These pay rates are not sufficient to maintain, much less improve the standard o f
living for families, moreover, the earnings necessary to reach the federal poverty line
continues to rise each year, note the $1,700 difference from 2001 to 2005. These figures
point to increased job creation at lowest levels o f the wage spectrum, subsequently,
painting a grim picture o f employment prospects for the majority o f Americans.
In the light o f new realities concerning ascendancy o f service sector employment and
its inherent wage inequities, the labor movement has expanded its fight to organizing the
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service industry. This industry, as previously posited, is not as susceptible to
reorganization and out-sourcing. These external factors establish the sector as a prime
target for reinvigorating labor power.
This chapter has attempted to explain the economic factors affecting American
workers. The wage gap, decline o f real wages, diminishing job security, and falling union
density have affected potential union strength and ability to mobilize. Union membership
may be the most vital option for increasing job security, wages, and benefits for United
States workers. Perhaps, corporate campaigns are a useful strategy for leveling the
playing field between corporate America and its workers, assuring that their grievances
do not go unheard and possibly paving the way for improved standards o f living.

51

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY
This study examines the effects o f union corporate campaigns. In order to analyze the
characteristics and end results of the phenomena the research design employed in this
study is qualitative. This approach helps to present a middle range theory that attempts to
explain whether the independent variable, engaging in corporate campaigns, influences
the outcome o f the dependent variable, concessions. Since this is a mid-range theory, it
has limited external validity and is best applied to labor union conflict environments.
The independent and dependent variables are linked together through intervening
variables. These are the tactics and contexts in which the campaigns were conducted.
This is an explanatory study seeking to test for a causal relationship between unions’
applications o f corporate campaigns to labor conflicts and business forfeiture. Although
the cases were chosen inductively, which will be clarified shortly, the study was
approached deductively. The theory was formed before any efforts were embarked upon
to research data.
Intervening variables that connect the independent and dependent variables are
corporate campaign contexts and tactics. Organizing, strike complement, and strike
substitute campaigns are contexts in which cases are evaluated (Jarley and Maranto
1990). Tactics examined within these circumstances are litigation, coalition building,
pressuring the company’s financial associates, on-job actions, exerting pressure on
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government officials, efforts to compel regulatory agencies investigations o f businesses
breaches o f law, protests, and negative publicity campaigns waged against the offending
companies.
The control variables that may affect a campaign’s tactics used, as well as their
victory or defeat, as specified in the diagram, are the external economic and legislative
environment. For the purposes o f this study, these are assessed by whether or not the
campaign was waged during a recessions and if labor actions took place in a state that has
right-to-work laws. As mentioned in preceding chapters, recessions may undermine labor
initiatives, primarily because economic downturns make it more difficult for unions to
rally both internal and community support. Internal support may be weak as a
consequence; therefore, potential participants might have concerns about losing their
jobs. On the other hand, external support may not be present if the union neglects to
gather support by framing their cause in terms o f social injustice as opposed to simple
economic self-interest (Perry 1987).
The second control variable is whether the particular state in which the campaign was
conducted had enacted right-to-work laws. Companies take advantage o f this legislation
in order to ‘bust unions,’ in other words, businesses have the upper hand to fire, at will,
any workers voicing dissension or calling for union organization (AFL-CIO).
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igure 4.1: Assertion o f Causality
Intervening Variable: Tactics
used by Unions during a
Corporate Campaigns

Dependent
Variable: Whether
Unions Gain Sought
after Concessions

Independent
Variable: Union
Engaged in a
Corporate Campaign

Control
Variable:
Recession

Intervening Variable:
Contexts o f
Corporate
Campaigns

Control
Variable:
Right-to-Work
Laws

Another external consideration, which is not a control variable, but does need to be
discussed, is that union density has dropped nationwide prior to and throughout the
period examined. This negatively influences the potential pressure that labor, as an
interest group, could wield in economic and political spheres. Shrinking density has
additionally diminished the availability o f resources, specifically union dues and
mobilizable members, which unions require for pursuing tactics, such as strikes and
costly publicity campaigns. Union dues are generally not increased to compensate for the
shortfall because union members are unwilling to vote to do so.
The aforementioned variables are tools used to explore the primary question o f this
paper: Have unions that engaged in corporate campaigns been effective in gaining
concessions from businesses? The variables are also fundamental for examining the
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secondary hypothesis; Are there identifiable combinations o f tactics that may be used in
specific campaign contexts that result in unions gaining concessions?

Collection o f Data
Only cases with documented outcomes were included for analysis. Fifteen cases are
examined in this study. The criteria for case selection was; 1) if a campaign was reported
by media or labor organizations to have succeeded, failed, or the union declared that the
campaign was over and 2) that the cases demonstrated variation on the independent and
dependant variables.
The selected cases were drawn from secondary sources such as newspapers, affiliated
labor organizations, and unions’ public statements. Academic Universe, Lexis-Nexis,
Newspaper Source, and Pro-Quest were the primary databases used to find the majority
o f articles involving corporate campaign cases. General Internet searches were also used
to access supplemental articles and union statements. It was essential that each case
selected had at least two sources stating the same key tactics were utilized and reaffirmed
campaign outcomes. This increased the validity o f campaign data analyzed. At least five
cases were lost due to this corroboration benchmark. Waning media interest and union’s
discontinuing publicity o f their efforts were the primary causes for omission.
There are some biases concerning case selection in terms o f the unions that were most
commonly engaging in corporate campaigns. The service industry unions accounted for
six out o f the total campaigns waged. This is primarily due to stability and job growth o f
the service industry sector and additionally attributable to unions viewing this expanding
industry as a prime target for unionization. Furthermore, cases may have occurred that

55

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

were not covered by media. Lack o f coverage may be attributable to lack o f space in a
publication, an assumed lack of public interest in the story on behalf o f the journalist, or
simply that unions were not successful in obtaining media attention.
The data may also reflect some regional biases. The northeast and southern parts o f
the Unites States account for most o f the corporate campaigns undertaken. The northeast
has traditionally been America’s manufacturing core, because o f its port access and rich
mineral caches; therefore it could be concluded that union actions in this area are focused
on retaining jobs and rights for workers in the companies still remaining in that region
(U.S. Department o f State). The southern parts o f the nation have recently emerged as a
prime location for manufacturing. The reason for this area’s rising popularity for business
relocations is that it is characterized by low union density, lower wages, and state and
local governments’ generous tax breaks (Primedia Business Magazines & Media
Inc.2002).
Secondary case selection and analysis was used because corporate campaign event
descriptions were easily obtainable in this manner. This was the best way to retrieve the
information quickly and with the least expense. Another advantage o f this method is that
it aided in increasing content validity by providing direct occurrences and details of
corporate campaigns. However, because the cases were chosen inductively there may be
selection bias present. Another possible downfall o f this approach is that the accounts
might have contained journalistic inaccuracies. A major weakness for this type o f case
selection is that evaluation is based upon unions claiming a wins or losses. If a union
releases a statement proclaiming victory, there are limited means o f acquiring
information through this method stating otherwise. It is hoped that these concerns
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pertaining to data inconsistencies were remedied through triangulating every case found
through the previously discussed sources.
A principle consideration that motivated using a qualitative approach was small
numbers o f reported corporate campaigns. This prevented the application o f quantitative
analysis, which would have required a much larger sample than the fifteen corporate
campaign cases yielded. One reason for this shortcoming is that numbers o f available
sample cases were limited by the timeline explored, in this study, the first case begins in
1990 and the last case ended in June 2005.

Data Analysis
The data are addressed to ascertain not only whether corporate campaigns work, and
additionally evaluate why they achieved positive or negative outcomes.
Union backgrounds, campaign duration, and complete accounts o f each case are
examined to provide the reader with an accurate illustration of union actions. This is
relevant for evaluating whether these factors had any bearing on, or instrumental value in
bringing about the results.
In order to evaluate outcomes and preserve the internal validity o f the research, tactics
and contexts are assessed and categorized to discover if there was direct causality—that
the union’s application o f tactics in designated situations directly produced a settlement.
If found that there was no relationship between tactics, contexts, and unions gaining
concessions, then there is a null hypothesis present. If a null hypothesis is the product of
analysis then the campaign may have been concluded due to some other extraneous
cause. Concurrently, if realized that tactics applied in particular scenarios created
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successful outcomes, then the conclusions for the case will be to reject the null
hypothesis. It bears to be mentioned that spurious relationships may be present if those
involved in either the business or union side o f the conflict falsely cited certain tactics
used as being effective in influencing outcomes.
Case categorization adheres to the following format. First, some cases are classified
as “wins.” This indicates that unions won all o f their sought after concessions. Second is
an intermediate category, signifying that concessions were achieved, but the union did
not label the campaign a clear win. Another clarification o f an intermediate designation is
if there is ambiguity as to whether all sought after gains were acquired, but present is a
substantial negotiated settlement. The third are losses. This denotes that the union
declared a loss, or that a contract was achieved—but finalized because the union
conceded givebacks or concessions. A union proclaiming that they have ended the
conflict with no win, or they were voted out as the primary bargaining unit also specifies
a defeat.
After the cases are categorized, they are compared in order to examine the tactics
employed by unions in similar contexts, for example the use o f a boycott during a strike
substitute campaign. The usefulness o f a particular tactic in a specific context is measured
in terms o f how often the particular strategy was applied and the frequency with which it
yielded positive outcomes, concessions from businesses.
A qualitative methodological approach was the most appropriate line o f attack for this
analysis. The data are events driven, therefore rational organization o f contexts and
tactics analyzed through a comparative structure was the most logical approach to this
examination o f corporate campaigns.
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CHAPTER 5

FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
This chapter presents the issues and outcomes o f corporate campaigns in 15 cases.
The backgrounds o f each union are presented and issues that prompted labor to initiate
their campaigns explored. Each case is summarized, differentiating the context in which
it was fought and categorized according to tactics used throughout the dispute. Campaign
outcomes are examined to understand the frequency with which certain types o f
campaigns were conducted and their applied strategies. These conclusions are
subsequently compared and contrasted among cases to investigate if any causal
relationship is present between the independent and dependant variables.

Union Backgrounds
Unions are the central bargaining unit for workers, facilitating contract negotiations
and labor organization. It is fundamental to understand the history o f a particular union,
in order to know why certain unions act on behalf o f a particular group o f workers. This
is why historical summaries o f each union involved in corporate campaigns are outlined
in this study.
The United Steelworkers o f America (USWA) provided union representation for
workers in four out o f the fifteen corporate campaigns, thereby making it the prominent
bargaining agent in the study. The companies involved in the disputes were Ravenswood
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Aluminum Corporation, Bayou Steel Company, Bridgestone-Firestone Inc., and
Continental General Tire.
The USW A was founded on May 22, 1942. Various industry sectors shape the
membership o f the USWA, extending through both public and private spheres. However,
union association is primarily concentrated in the fields o f metal production and mining.
Other industries are also represented, such as healthcare fields. Primary goals o f the
United Steelworkers are job security for its members, fairness and equality o f opportunity
and decent conditions in the workplace (Retrieved: 29 Jan. 2006.
http://www.steelworkers-usw.org/usw/program/content/301.php). At its height in the
1970’s, the union represented 1.5 million members, both working and retired throughout
North America. However, numbers had dwindled by the time it joined Paper, AlliedIndustrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International Union (PACE) in January o f
2005, creating a combined membership o f 850,000 (Retrieved: 29 Jan. 2006.
http://www.steelworkers-usw.org/usw/program/content/301 .php). Since the merger, the
union was renamed the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing,
Energy, Allied-Industrial and Service Workers International Union. They intend to
continue U SW A’s drive towards improving wages, benefits, and overall conditions for its
workers.
Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International Union (HERE) is the second
most frequently involved union in the included cases. HERE negotiated grievances for
employees in three o f the fifteen campaigns. The Riese Organization, Cipriani Group,
and La Costa Resort and Spa were businesses in the sample that went head to head with
the union.
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The Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International Union was established
in 1891. Serving as the primary bargaining unit for employees in the hospitality sector, it
sought to increase standards o f living for its members through higher wages and benefits.
On July 8, 2004, it combined with the Union o f Needletrades, Textiles, Industrial
Employees (UNITE), at which time their numbers increased to 500,000 working, and
400,000 retired members throughout the United States and Canada (Retrieved: 11 Feb.
2006. http://www.unitehere.org/about/historv.asn).
The Union o f Needletrades, Textiles and Industrial Employees (UNITE), prior to its
merger with HERE accounts for one o f the examined cases. Goya Food Inc. is the only
case obtained that was targeted by the union.
UNITE was founded in 1995 through consolidation with the International Ladies
Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) and the Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers
Union (ACTWU) (Retrieved: 11 Feb. 2006. http ://www.unitehere.org/about/history.asp).
Prior to its merger with the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International
Union (HERE), the union represented 210,000 garment, textile, and laundry workers in
the United States (Retrieved: 11 Feb. 2006. http://www.unitehere.org/about/historv.asp).
Combining membership o f the Union o f Needletrades, Textiles and Industrial
Employees and the Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International Union
resulted in an amalgamation renamed UNITE HERE. Angelica Textile Services is the
one company in the sample that had a corporate campaign waged against it by the newly
established union. One o f the union’s paramount goals is to achieve equitable treatment
for women and immigrant service employees.
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Another union using corporate campaigns was the International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers o f America (UAW), which
represented multiple locals in their actions against the Caterpillar Company. UAW was
launched in 1935. Today, it has grown to 500,000 retired and 620,000 active members
located all across North America and Puerto Rico (Retrieved: 11 Feb. 2006.
http://www.uaw.org/). There is virtually no sector that has not been organized by the
UAW. Private and public sector employees, global companies, and small businesses all
have members in the union. The UAW has centered their efforts on improving the wages,
on the job safety, and benefits o f their members; as well as involvement in advocating
civil rights, environmental improvements, and fair labor practices legislation (Retrieved:
11 Feb. 2006. http://www.uaw.org/).
United Paperworkers International Union (UPIU) acted on behalf o f the workers in
the A.E. Staley Manufacturing Company dispute. In 1972, the International Brotherhood
o f Pulp, Sulfite and Paper Mill Workers partnered with United Papermakers and
Paperworkers to create the United Paperworkers International Union (UPIU). The UPIU
later expanded, becoming Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers
International Union (PACE) when it fused with the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers in
1999. In January o f 2005, it went through yet another metamorphosis when PACE joined
the United Steelworkers o f America (Retrieved: 29 Jan. 2006.http://www.steelworkersusw.org/usw/program/content/301.php).
International Brotherhood o f Teamsters (IBT) is another union included in the sample
that conducted a corporate campaign. Their battle focused on Ovemite Transportation
Company. The IBT was established in 1903. The original Teamsters were responsible for
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the bulk o f cargo transportation in early America. By 1912, the IBT expanded from horse
drawn carriages to motorized vehicle transport o f goods. Throughout two World Wars
until the 1970s, the union held steadfast and grew despite economic and political
adversity. Since then numbers have decreased, now the Teamsters have a membership o f
1,400,000 (Retrieved: 11 Feb. 2006. http://www.teamster.org) .
American Federation o f Labor-Congress o f Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)
instigated the corporate campaigns against Detroit News and Detroit Free Press on the
behalf o f their affiliates: Teamsters Local 372 and 2040, the Newspaper Guild Local 22,
the Graphic Communications International Union (GCIU) Local 13N and Local 289, and
the Detroit Typographical Union 18. Although the histories were readily unavailable for
each local, accounts o f the nationals are elaborated below.
The American Newspaper Guild was created in 1933. Its membership expanded
during the 1950s to include the National Guild o f Canadian Media, Manufacturing,
Professional & Service Workers. In the 1970s, the union changed its name to the
Newspaper Guild. In 1997, the union merged, along with its Canadian counterpart, with
the Communications Workers o f America (CWA). Newspaper Guild membership
consists of reporters, photographers, copy editors, clerks and building maintenance staff.
Primary motivations include traditional improvements o f wages and conditions, however,
it also seeks to adhere to and improve standards o f integrity within media, and expand
membership to others employed within the field (Retrieved: 28 Jan. 2006.
http ://www. cwa-union.org/about/history, asp).
Graphic Communications International Union (GCIU) is an accumulation o f mergers
beginning in 1882 with the founding o f the Amalgamated Lithographers o f America.
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They then joined with the International Printing Pressmen and Assistants Union in 1964
forming the Lithographers and Photoengravers International Union (LPIU). They again
increased their numbers in 1972 and 1973 when they merged with the International
Brotherhood o f Bookbinders and the International Printing Pressmen and Assistants
Union, subsequently creating the International Printing and Graphic Communications
Union (IPGCU). The final incarnation o f the GCIU occurred in 1983 when the Graphic
Arts International Union (GAIU) combined with the IPGCU. Their membership numbers
total 175,000 throughout the whole o f North America (Retrieved: 29 Jan. 2006.
http://www.eciusf.org).
The AFL-CIO national also interceded in the Detroit News case on behalf o f the
International Typographical Union Local 18. The International Typographical Union was
initially founded in 1852 and represented typesetters from the United States and Canada.
In 1987, it joined with the Communications Workers o f America (CWA). Within the
CWA, typesetters and mailers currently occupy a specialized branch o f the organization,
the Printing, Publishing and Media Workers Sector (PPMWS) (Retrieved: 28 Jan. 2006.
http://www.cwa-union.org/about/historv.asp).
The AFL-CIO, which provided resources and centralized decision-making for the
Detroit News and Detroit Free Press conflict, and was formed as a result o f a merger
between the American Federation o f Labor and the Congress o f Industrial Organizations
in 1955. The AFL-CIO currently has 9,000,000 members, comprised o f workers in
almost every sector throughout the public and private spheres. The chief purpose o f the
national is to spearhead economic and social justice for their members in the workplace,
community, and government (Retrieved: 7 Feb. 2006. http://www.aflcio.org).
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The Communications Workers o f America (CWA) is another partner o f the AFLCIO. CWA helped its members wage a corporate campaign opposed to Bell Atlantic
Corporation’s contract offerings. The CWA was launched in June o f 1947. It originally
represented 162,000 workers. Today, it has 700,000 workers in media, the airline
industry, public sector employment, electronics, and manufacturing. Membership spans
across the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico (Retrieved: 28 Jan. 2006.
http://www.cwa-union.org/about/historv.asn). Major concerns o f the union include the
prosperity o f its members and forwarding policy issues dealing with healthcare. Social
Security, and international trade.
The last union involved in the sample o f corporate campaigns is the Service
Employees International Union. They forged a corporate campaign against California’s
Catholic Healthcare W est (CHW).
SEIU is one o f the fastest growing unions in North America. The 1,800,000 members
are employed in the healthcare fields, public service, and property maintenance. The
union was originally established in 1921 under the name o f the Building Service
Employees International Union (BSEIU). In 1968, the union changed its name to Service
Employees International Union (SEIU) (Retrieved: 7 Feb. 2006. http://www.seiu.org).
The current objectives o f the SEIU are to empower their members politically—in their
communities and in their workplaces by bringing people together across sectors under the
banner of one universal workers union.
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Case Summaries
The circumstances in which corporate campaigns are used as tools for winning
employer recognition and concessions are diverse and labor actions are primarily
derivative o f the resources that a union has at its disposal and leadership decisions. Union
strength, financial reserves, and ability to mobilize influence tactical choices (i.e. whether
leadership will embark upon an expensive negative publicity campaign) and effects that a
corporate campaign will have on company bottom-lines. Below are summaries o f the
sampled cases, their contexts, tactics, and outcomes.

Ravenswood Aluminum Corporation
Ravenswood Aluminum Corporation is the first occurrence o f a corporate campaign
included in the sampled time-span. The Ravenswood plant, located in West Virginia, was
built in 1957 as an aluminum manufacturing facility. It had heen a part o f the Kaiser
Aluminum Corporation until the sale o f the business in February o f 1989, producing
Ravenswood Aluminum Corporation (Retrieved: 27 Jan 2005.
http ://202.165.76.70/Smelters/al/Ravenswood.htm).
The USWA began their actions against the company on November I, 1990. The
issues provoking the conflict were failure to arrive at a contract, threats from
management to combine jobs, forced overtime, pay and pensions, and lack o f enforced
safety regulations (WeissmanI991). When their contract came up for renewal in 1990,
management proposed severe cuts in benefits and jobs. The union refused to make
concessions, resulting in a lockout, which was instituted on November 1, 1990, involving
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1,700 employees. Replacement workers were hired to fill the locked out employee’s
positions (W eissmanl991).
Lockouts, for the purposes o f this study, fall into the same context as strike
complement, because employees are not in the workplace and lack the ability to engage
in on-job actions that give them the power to compel concessions through work
slowdowns and pressures on a company’s bottom-line. Subsequently, the ability to
pursue on-site actions characterizes lockouts as more akin to strike complement than
strike substitute or organizing campaigns.
USWA Local 5668’s corporate campaign targeted the majority shareholder o f
Ravenswood, Marc Rich. Rich fled the United States in 1983 to avoid charges o f tax
evasion, investment fraud, and racketeering. Union investigators were sent to Switzerland
to research possible connections between Ravenswood Aluminum and Marc Rich
(Draper 2003). After discovering that there was indeed a link, the USWA made Rich one
o f the central targets o f their campaign in the hope that he would force company
management to bargain.
The first corporate campaign tactic used in the battle were union protests outside o f
Swiss government offices, voicing disapproval at the government for harboring Rich
(Draper 2003). Additional rallies on plant property and shareholder meetings were
conducted.
The union also pursued the avenue o f pressuring Rich’s financial associates. This
strategy, combined with protests and negative publicity were key to his subsequent denial
o f interests in the Slovakian National Aluminum Company and also deterred him from a
majority share in a Romanian hotel (Bergin 2005).
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The negative publicity campaign exploited the criminal accusations against Rich to
create “Wanted” leaflets. The flyers displaying his picture and the charges were
distributed throughout the United States and Switzerland (Bergin 2005).
Boycotts were also influential in the campaign. USW A established a boycott targeting
beverage companies who purchased aluminum cans from Ravenswood Aluminum. As a
result, Stroh’s and Budweiser terminated their contracts with the company (Bergin 2005).
The union additionally pressured for regulatory agency investigations o f the
company. USWA filed grievances against the company with OSHA (Draper 2003 and
Bergin 2005). The plant inspections led to massive fines. OSHA’s subsequent findings
were publicized, allowing for the USWA to form coalitions with environmental
organizations as a result o f Ravenswood’s’ poor safety and environmental record.
Litigation was yet another tactic used by the union. The USWA filed several unfair
labor charges with the NLRB (Bergin 2005). Ravenswood’s reaction to the union’s
accusations included stalled contract negotiations, increasing plant security measures to
thwart protestors, and continued scab labor recruitment.
The campaign was successfully concluded in April 1992, in spite o f management’s
anti-union maneuverings. Marc Rich eventually caved under the pressures o f the negative
publicity and $29 million in contract losses. He fired the company’s executives, paving
the way for contract negotiations by hiring management that was more amenable to
reaching a settlement (Draper 2003). The final deal included reinstatement o f locked-out
workers jobs and back pay, and wage and pension increases (Draper 2003). Overtime and
job combining issues were discussed and compromised on, however, no monetary or
benefit givebacks were present.
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Caterpillar Company
The second case is a campaign waged by the UAW involving the Caterpillar
Company. Caterpillar Company, established in 1925, was the result o f a merger between
two California firms: the Holt Tractor Company and the Best Tractor Company.
Headquartered in Peoria, Illinois, Caterpillar manufactures construction equipment for
building roads, logging, and pipelines (Retrieved: 2 Feb. 2006. http://www.cat.com/).
The conflict began in November 1991, when the first strike commenced. The strike,
however, came to an end in April 1992, when workers unconditionally accepted
previously rejected contract terms, because o f Caterpillar’s threats to replace the striking
workers (Devinatz 2005). The corporate campaign ensued soon after the strikers returned
to work. Predominant issues throughout the conflict were union charges o f unfair labor
practices. Caterpillar’s threats to relocate to Mexico, wages and cost o f living increases,
pensions, job security, and the hiring o f temporary workers (Cimini 1998 and Cohen

2002).
On-job actions occurred from 1992 until the second strike started in 1994. Tactics
used within this strategy were work slow downs, (employees performing their jobs at the
bare minimum), wildcat strikes (mass job walkouts lasting from a couple o f hours to two
days), and inside games (workers wearing union regalia, lunchtime rallies and protests,
and engaging in onsite leafleting) (Cohen 2002).
The second strike began in June 1994 and ended in November 1995, involving
roughly 9,000 workers. This is when the context became a strike complement corporate
campaign. Caterpillar retaliated against the union by applying their contingency plans o f
hiring previously screened and interviewed scab workers (Devinatz 2005).
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UAW ’s campaign against Caterpillar at this point took place on four battlegrounds—
Illinois, Tennessee, Colorado, and Pennsylvania. Throughout the on-job actions and the
strike, the union waged a negative publicity campaign which included publishing fullpage newspaper advertisements attacking Caterpillar, gaining television airtime on local
programs to expose union grievances and frame the company’s actions in the dispute as
egregious and recalcitrant (Devinatz 2005). Included in the unions media blitz against the
company were national conferences aired by the UAW (Devinatz 2005).
The union also applied pressure on the company’s financial associates. UAW
members picketed and handed out flyers at shareholder meetings. They additionally sent
letters to Caterpillar customers warning them that the campaign would continue to
escalate if company management did not come to the bargaining table (Devinatz 2005).
Other letters were mailed to investment brokers, stating that the company was in a dire
financial situation due to the prolonged conflict, urging them to advise their clients to
cease investments in Caterpillar (Devinatz 2005).
Protest was a largely applied strategy as well. Demonstrations, picketing, and
distributing flyers occurred at Caterpillar trade shows, dealerships, during company
sponsored community activities and sporting events, and also took place outside
executives’ residences (Devinatz 2005).
Litigation was a final tactic used. Over 1,000 charges were filed with the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) by the union (Cohen 2002).
The second strike ended in late 1995, when the union advised members to break from
the strike and unconditionally return to work (Devinatz 2005). The UAW hoped that this
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would hurry a settlement; instead, union members voted down the negotiated contract in
December o f that year by 78 percent (Cohen 2002).
After the contract was rejected. Caterpillar retaliated against union’s strategies by
instituting rules severely hindering any on-job actions through the threat o f legal actions
against the offending employee and possible job loss. However, the campaign continued,
marked by sporadic demonstrations, but the overall strength o f the union action
weakened due to lack o f centralized UAW support and perilous consequences for
workers undertaking in-plant actions (Devinatz 2005). UAW members finally approved a
contract in February 1998, which was similar to one previously rejected in 1995
(Devinatz 2005).
The campaign falls into the intermediate category, due to the givebacks outlined in
the agreement. Moreover, union actions had no effect on the company's stock, ability to
attract investors, or its earnings (Devinatz 2005). The givebacks outlined in the final
contract were: no pattern bargaining, eliminated company co-payments for retiree
healthcare, adoption o f a two-tier wage that started new hires at 70 percent o f entry level
union scale, allowed longer workdays and workweeks without overtime pay, and gave
management the right to hire temporary and subcontracted employees, whereby reducing
the number o f union jobs (Devinatz 2005). Contract gains included some increases for
wage and pensions, assured job security for full-time workers, a moratorium on
relocation plans to Mexico, limits on the number o f temporary hires, and a freeze on plant
closures (Cohen 2002).
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A.E. Staley Manufacturing Company
The United Paper workers International Union (UPIU) Local 7837 corporate
campaign waged against A.E. Staley Manufacturing Company began in 1992. A.E. Staley
Manufacturing Company is located in Decatur, Illinois. Staley is one o f the largest com
refiners in the United States, producing com symp and food starches. It became a
subsidiary o f Tate & Lyle PLC. in 1989. The parent enterprise is located in the United
Kingdom (Retrieved: 5 Feb. 2Q06.http://www.tateandlvle.co.uk/).
After a proposed contract was voted down by 97 percent o f Local 7837 in late 1992,
the union members decidedly embarked on a corporate campaign (Weissman 1996).
UPIU began their contract campaign with on-job actions including work slow downs,
wildcat strikes and inside games. As a result o f these engagements and their subsequent
drag on production, Staley refused to give in to union contract demands. Instead,
management retaliated by locking out 700 workers on June 27, 1993 (Weissman 1996).
The contract issues to which Staley was so vehemently opposed were guarantees for
seniority rights, retention o f established grievance procedures, moratorium on
subcontracting to nonunion plants, increases in worker safety, and the union’s rejection of
12-hour rotating shifts (Weissman 1996).
The context for the campaign is a strike complement campaign as categorized by a
lockout. Another tactic employed in this scenario by Local 7837 was protest; locked out
employees and sympathetic members o f the public and allied unions frequently held
demonstrations outside the plant’s gates. Other protests initiated aimed at pressuring
government agencies. One in particular was held in front o f the State o f Illinois Center in
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Chicago, not for the purpose o f urging support for contract concessions, but to protest
unpaid unemployment benefits for locked out Staley employees (Roman 1993).
Boycotts focused on pressuring Staley’s financial associates were additionally
conducted throughout the campaign. The first targeted Miller Beer, who did suspended
their contracts with Staley, and Pepsi Co., who did not. The second boycott was aimed at
State Farm. State Farm was targeted because o f its stock holdings in Tate & Lyle. It was
the UPIU’s intention that a consumer boycott against the State Farm would pull the
insurance company into the conflict, and in turn force Staley to the bargaining table
(Socialist Worker Online 1996).
Litigation was also used to persuade a contract settlement. The UPIU filed complaints
to the NLRB stating Staley threatened to permanently replace locked out employees with
temporary workers, charges which were which were upheld (Detroit Workers' Voice
1996).
Coalition building proved to be a mixed bag o f results. UPIU successfully allied with
UAW members involved in the Caterpillar dispute and USWA members who waged their
own campaign that targeted Bridgestone-Firestone Inc., forming solidarity between the
three unions, creating an alliance now known as the "War Zone” (Socialist Worker
Online\996). The counter example to the abovementioned is the UPIU attempt to expand
sympathy for their plight through appealing to union nationals. UPIU wrote letters to the
Teamsters, the International Brotherhood o f Electrical Workers (IBEW), the United
Steelworkers (USW) and the Laborers International Union of America (LIUNA) asking
them to refrain from crossing the picket line. No response was received and the
aforementioned unions furnished no support during the conflict (Weissman 1996).
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The dispute ended on December 22, 1995, with the UPIU Local 7837 accepting a
contract offer validated by 286 with 226 votes against (Weissman 1996). The contract
Staley offered had lower benefits than the one they had previously rejected in October
1992. Only 180 o f the total 700 workers returned to work, without back pay, the
remaining accepted severance packages, leaving 350 employed after the conflict
(Weissman 1996). In sum, the accepted contract agreed to 12-hour rotating shifts,
weakened seniority rights, limitations on previously implemented grievance procedures,
no improvements for worker safety, and relented to subcontracting to nonunion facilities
(Weissman 1996). This case is classified in the intermediate category, because a contract
settlement was eventually reached that included increases in wages and benefits, although
it did not include all sought after concessions.

Bayou Steel Company
The United Steelworkers o f America (USWA) Local 9121 strike complement
corporate campaign with Bayou Steel Company started in January o f 1993. Bayou Steel
is located in La Place, Louisiana. The company was founded in 1981 as a holding of
Austria's Voest-Alpine. A few years later in 1986, the steel company was sold to RSR
Corporation (Retrieved: 7 Feb. 2Q06.http://www.bavousteel.com/). That same year.
Bayou Steel workers adopted the USW A as their central bargaining agent (Northrup and
Steen 1999).
The corporate campaign was produced through a break down in contract negotiations
in March 1993. The contentious issues included higher wages, opposition to Bayou’s
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sought after productivity-based pay and overall benefit and wage cuts, concerns over
work hours, and the replacement o f striking workers with scab laborers (Rich 2002).
In March 1993, 300 USWA members went on strike; consequently, 400 temporary
workers were hired by Bayou as replacements for the striking employees (Rich 2002 and
Northrup and Steen 1999).
Protest was a primary tactic used throughout the conflict. Strikers traveled to Texas to
demonstrate in front o f the home o f Bayou Steel's chairperson o f the board, Howard
Meyers (Northrup and Steen 1999). USWA also picketed the residence o f Bayou's
President, Jerry Pitts on numerous occasions, as well as plant managers (Northrup and
Steen1999).
Negative publicity campaigns focused on bringing public attention to USW A’s
grievances with Bayou. This tactic was employed to pressure business associates and
investors as well. Principal actions within this category include a February 1998
advertisement placed by the union in the Wall Street Journal stating, “Bayou Steel
Corporation: Fined. Under Investigation. Charged” (Northrup and Steen 1999, p.3).
Pressure on regulatory agencies was another predominant approach. Complaints were
filed by the USW A with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA). Union members also filed grievances with state level agencies like the
Louisiana Board o f Commerce and the Industry and the Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality (Northrup and Steen 1999). The strategy yielded results. In 1993
and 1994, the company attempted to refinance their mortgage bonds; in accordance with
established procedures. Bayou had to file with the SEC to refinance its $75 million in
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holdings (Northrup and Steen 1999). The SEC was then forced to investigate claims that
Bayou’s alleged noncompliance to environmental regulations would possibly affect the
company’s viability in the future and in turn, render it unable to repay the borrowed loans
(Northrup and Steen 1999). This tactic worked, because it temporarily held hostage
Bayou’s search for capital.
Complaints by union members to the EPA also forwarded allegations that Bayou was
amiss in their adherence to environmental laws. The USWA manufactured reports
entitled "Environmental Audit: Bayou Steel Corporation" (Northrup and Steen 1999).
The article was distributed to the EPA, media, public, and various environmental
organizations (Northrup and Steen 1999). The report was also presented to the Louisiana
Board o f Commerce and Industry (BCI), in order to convince the board to refrain from
giving Bayou Steel tax reductions. (Northrup and Steen 1999). The widespread report did
succeed in persuading the BCI to refrain from awarding Bayou preferential tax breaks.
The USWA additionally attempted to coerce Bayou Steel’s financial associates. RSR
Corporation, Bayou’s parent company, was contacted and asked to intervene on the
union’s behalf to compel management to bargain with the union (Northrup and Steen
1999). The USWA also sent letters to the board o f directors asking them to help establish
contract negotiations. The union furthermore suggested in their correspondence that they
intended to continue their corporate campaign against the company if bargaining was not
resumed (Northrup and Steen 1999).
Another, less significant feature o f the USW A’s corporate campaign was litigation, in
the form o f unfair labor charged against Bayou filed with the NLRB. This tactic was not
reported to have influence management, nor bolster support for the campaign.
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Bayou retaliated to the USW A’s aggressive strategies by alleging that the union
violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), arguing that
the tactics used were akin to blackmail (Northrup and Steen 1999). Bayou Steel filed
their grievances with the United States District Court in the District o f Delaware charging
that the regulatory harassment o f the company was intended to coerce a collective
bargaining agreement (Northrup and Steen 1999).
The strike complement campaign ended in September 1996, as a resounding loss.
Despite Bayou’s legal fees totaling roughly $3 million, concessions were not generously
given. The contract accepted included no improvements and only negotiated after
fruitless union expenditures totaled $3 million for the battle waged (Northrup and Steen
1999). The tenets o f the contract were not voted on by Local 9121, but instead approved
by the national (USWA), and conceded major concessions to the company. Members
received no wage increases, the few reinstated employees received no back pay, a
productivity based wage system was implemented, and employee paid healthcare
contributions were not raised (Northrup and Steen 1999). The main impetus for the
contract settlement by the USWA was to have the RICO charges dropped. The company,
aside from numerous benefits gained from the contract, also won provisions to have all
pending suits against them dropped (Northrup and Steen 1999).

Bridgestone-F irestone Inc.
The labor conflict between the United Steelworkers o f America (USWA), acting on
behalf o f the United Rubber Workers (URW) against Bridgestone-F irestone Inc., was a
strike complement coupled with a lockout campaign that took place in Illinois beginning
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on July 12, 1994. Harvey S. Firestone founded Firestone Tires in 1900 in Akron, Ohio. In
1988, Bridgestone Corporation o f Japan bought out the company, whereby establishing
Bridgestone-F irestone Inc. as a transnational business enterprise (Retrieved: 2 Feb. 2006.
http://www.firestone 100.com/historv/1OOvears ff.html).
The dispute began with a strike brought on by contract negotiations failure.
Bridgestone-Firestone Inc. pressed its employees for concessions, which included
extended workweeks, shifts, and decreases in pay and benefits, and increases in
healthcare co-pays (Kaye 1996). Additional URW grievances, aside from those
previously discussed, were the company’s reluctance to raise hourly pay so that it would
rival industry prevailing rates and deficient benefits packages (Kaye 1996).
The strike action of the campaign ended in May 1995, in the midst o f the union
giving an unconditional surrender to the company, based on the expectation that there
would be a continuation o f contract negotiations. However, Bridgestone refused to rehire
all of the striking employees and instead exacerbated the situation by turning it into a
lockout. Bridgestone hired temporary workers to replace the locked out employees,
furthermore, threatening to permanently retain the scab laborers. The union’s response to
Bridgestone’s retaliatory measures was to file an unfair labor practices complaints with
the NLRB.
In July 1995, the URW merged with the USWA, who decided to escalate the dispute
into a corporate campaign with the intentions o f swaying management into negotiations
for an equitable contract (Kaye 1996). After the two unions joined forces, the number of
workers involved in the dispute expanded to 6,000 at various Bridgestone-Firestone
plants (Kaye 1996).
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A tactic used in the conflict to pressure investors and involve the public was a cyber
campaign launched by the union. Mass emails sent urged customers, retailers, and
investors to boycott Bridgestone-Firestone (W alker 2001). Internet addresses were
obtained by labor activists building databases o f concerned sympathizers who signed up
to receive updates o f union action through the USW A website. The Internet addresses for
retailers and investors were a matter o f public record and listed on the USW A’s website,
subsequently offering the opportunity for those concerned with the conflict to voice their
objections. They also included updates, both on the website and through emails, on the
obstinate stance the company assumed throughout the dispute. As a response to the
cyber-campaign, the company implemented an alternative email system as contingency,
fearing a server overload resulting from massive emails supporting the locked-out
workers (Walker 2001).
The cyber-campaign was also accompanied by a negative publicity campaign. The
USWA invested in a barrage o f radio advertisements detailing union member’s
grievances and criticizing Bridgestone for stonewalling negotiations (Greenhouse 1996).
A successful facet o f the USW A’S grassroots boycott strategy was that their letter
writing, negative publicity campaign, and demonstrations resulted in 30 city councils to
passing resolutions boycotting the use o f Bridgestone-Firestone Inc. tires on municipal
vehicles. The boycott had a negative influence on the company’s bottom-line and may
have been fundamental for pressuring management to bargain. Another positive feature
o f the campaign was that a number o f USWA supporters and activists ran for local public
offices, promoting agendas and platforms seeking resolutions to the contract battle
(Greenhouse 1996).
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Also widely employed in the battle were protests. Demonstrations took place at the
Indianapolis 500 and other car races encouraging a boycott o f the company. Members
also held rallies and handed out flyers in front o f tire dealerships throughout the United
States (Greenhouse 1996). The USW A additionally engaged in daily vigils outside
Bridgestone’s corporate headquarters in Nashville, Tennessee. The protests spread to
overseas locations, where allies o f the locked out workers exhibited their solidarity by
protesting plants in eight other countries (Kaye 1996). Japan, France, Brazil, and
Argentina are examples o f where solidarity protests occurred at Bridgestone-F irestone
affiliated plants and outlets, whereby demonstrating the unions marked success in
building cohesive coalitions (Kaye 1996).
A contract settlement was reached in November o f 1996. The union had a sizable
victory, obtaining reinstatement for all locked out employees and back pay. Provisions in
the contract additionally provided for wage and benefit increases, sealed Bridgestone’s
pact to stop seeking co-pay increases, and secured the union’s agreement to drop all
charges filed with the NLRB (Kaye 1996). The issues pertaining to longer shifts and
extending workweeks evaporated during the negotiations (Kaye 1996).

Ovemite Transportation Company
The International Brotherhood o f Teamsters (IBT) conflict with Ovemite
Transportation Company was as a strike complement campaign launched in 1999
(Machalaba 1999). Ovemite is located in Richmond, Virginia and employs more than
14,000 workers across the United States. They have roughly 170 terminals that deliver
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freight, o f these, 140 went on strike. Union Pacific Corporation currently owns the
transportation company (Machalaba 1999 and Lewis 2000).
The number o f workers involved in the dispute became a debatable figure between
Ovemite and the Teamsters. The union asserted that they represented roughly 5,800
workers, whereas the company countered that the union was only acting on behalf of
1,800 employees (Lewis 2000). The primary motivation for the strike was the two
parties’ inability to agree on the terms o f a first contract. One o f the sticking points was
the company’s strong opposition to the Teamsters absorption and control o f Ovemite
employees’ pension funds. The union sought to deposit the funds into their general
retirement fund accounts; members also objected to grievance procedures and work mles,
and the Teamsters wanted wages raised from $17 an hour to $17.25 (Machalaba 1999).
Litigation was the predominant tactic used. The Teamsters filed more than 1,000
complaints with the NLRB, charging that Ovemite had intimidated, illegally fired, and
harassed its members (Lewis 2000).
Coalition building was another pursued strategy, which yielded results. Union
sympathizers and members conducted mobile picketing, following Ovemite’s tmcks to
their destinations and protesting outside o f the businesses where the goods delivered
(Bigler 2002). Other competing companies, such as Yellow Freight and United Parcel
Service, showed their support for the workers by refusing to cross picket lines, and load
or deliver shipments (Bigler 2002).
Teamsters’ calls for a boycott o f Ovemite and its mobile rallies spurred management
to take retaliatory measures. Ovemite charged that the union was engaging in an unlawful
secondary boycott, indicting specific union activists and upper echelon leadership within
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the organization (Bigler 2002). A secondary boycott is “an attempt by labor to convince
others to stop doing business with a firm that is the subject o f a primary boycott;
prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act” (Wikipedia). The allegations made by Ovemite
additionally asserted that other delivery companies refused to cross picket lines, whereby
dismpting supply lines. This charge did have merit, considering Yellow Freight and
United Parcel Service did indeed refuse to cross the picket lines, verifying the validity of
the secondary boycott charges (Bigler 2002).
However, these union actions also resulted in the previously stated negative
consequence o f several union officials and activists being accused o f engaging in
secondary boycott actions, which may have contributed to a loss o f mobilization due to
activists’ fears that they would be subjected to criminal allegations as well.
After spending large amounts o f money and filing multiple lawsuits, Ovemite
successfully blocked the Teamsters from achieving a first contract (Bigler 2002). The
strike was called off in the summer o f 2002 and Ovemite terminals voted to decertify the
union, essentially, dismissing UBT as their bargaining agent (Bigler 2002). Employees,
prior to the decertification vote, had already begun to cross the picket lines and retum to
work, enticed by the company offerings o f increased pay and benefit packages, whereby
diminishing strike momentum (Bigler 2002).

Detroit News and Detroit Free Press
In June o f 1995, contract negotiations failed between AFL-CIO sponsored unions: the
Teamsters Local 372 and 2040, Newspaper Guild Local 22, the Graphic Communications
Intemational Union (GCIU) Local 13N and Local 289, and the Detroit Typographical
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Union 18 and the Knight-Ridder (owner o f Detroit Free Press) and Gannett (owner o f
Detroit News) publications companies the Detroit News and Detroit Free Press. The
jointly operating publishing companies refused to temporarily extend the contracts until a
new settlement could be negotiated, prompting a strike complement campaign that
commenced on July 13, 1995. Twenty-five hundred newspaper workers were involved in
the Detroit Michigan walkout (McCreery 1995).
Frank Gannett and his business partners founded New York’s Gannett Co. Inc. in
1906. The company expanded into operating television stations, numerous newspapers,
and radio stations. It currently owns 17 newspapers and 21 television stations throughout
the United States and runs 17 papers in the United Kingdom. Knight-Ridder Inc. was
established later in 1974 through the merger o f Knight Newspapers Inc. and Ridder
Publications Inc. It established a newspaper publishing partnership with Gannett Co. Inc.
in 1996. Currently, Knight-Ridder Inc. publishes 31 newspapers and is also a
predominate force in Internet publishing and online news media (Retrieved: 28 Jan. 2006.
http .-//www.kni ghtridder.com/about/corphi storv.html).
The contentious issues contributing to a suspended settlement were subcontracting,
job cutbacks, employee co-pays for insurance benefits, lack of cost o f living increases,
and the companies’ demands for a merit pay based wage system (McCreery 1995).
The AFL-CIO kicked off the campaign by launching a massive protest and leafleting
campaign calling for a boycott o f Detroit News and Detroit Free Press and publicizing
the unions’ issues. They asked individuals to cancel their paper subscriptions and
additionally pushed for businesses to stop placing ads in the publications. They suggested
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people instead purchase and buy advertisements in their strikers' newspaper The Detroit
Sunday Journal (The Intemational W orker’s Bulletin 1996).
The boycott achieved positive outcomes. The company lost 25 percent o f its
newspaper subscriptions and advertising revenue (McCreery 1995; Revolutionary
Worker Online 1997).
Another tactic exercised was protest. The unions applied pressure to the companies’
financial associated by holding demonstrations and handing out flyers at Gannet and
Knight-Ridder board meetings (Revolutionary Worker Online 1997). Members also
protested outside executives’ homes and held rallies at company headquarters and plant
gates (Revolutionary Worker Online 1997). Knight-Ridder and Gannett combated the
unions’ strategy by securing an injunction against mass picketing. The judge ordered that
no more than ten picketers could demonstrate outside the plants at any given time
(Revolutionary Worker Online 1997). The companies continued to intensify retaliations
against ever-present demonstrations by enforcing the injunction, leading to the arrests o f
300 union members and sympathizers in spring 1996 (Revolutionary Worker Online
1997).
The company’s retaliatory measures not only included hiring temporary employees to
keep the paper up and mnning during the strike, but also a comprehensive legal strategy.
Gannet and Knight-Ridder continued to use the courts, filing RICO charges against the
union. The companies stated in their accusations that members were attempting to strongarm negotiations through threats and acts o f vandalism. Gannet and Knight-Ridder
posited the AFL-CIO members physically intimidated employees and engaged in
vandalizing plant facilities and onsite vehicles (McCreery 1995).
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Despite the myriad o f charges, the union was still able to gain public support and
build alliances with public figures. The union partnered with former first lady Rosalyn
Carter to publicize the battle as well as to persuade the companies to reach a settlement
(Revolutionary Worker Online 1997). The president o f the Detroit City Council,
Maryann Mahaffey, also rallied behind the strikers by joining them on the picket lines
and releasing public statements supporting the workers and calling on the companies to
negotiate a contract (Gaboury 1995).
The AFL-CIO strike reduced the companies combined profits by roughly $46 million
in the first year o f the strike alone (McCreery 1995). However, the labor action failed to
prove successful. No contract was achieved (Holhut 1997). On February 14, 1997, the
union declared an end to the strike, requesting only that all employees be able to retum to
their formerly held positions (Revolutionary Worker Online 1997). Management initially
refused the union’s unconditional surrender, however, by April 1997, they allowed 200 o f
the 2,500 strikers to retum back to work (McCreery 1995). Frank Vega, Chief Executive
Officer o f the companies, originally openly snubbed the proposal, stating that the
company would exploit litigation to stonewall the union and a retum to work for its
members "until all strikers left town or died" (Revolutionary Worker Online 1997).
However, the union and Gannet and Knight-Ridder agreed to terms that would allow
workers to retum to work when job openings became available (Revolutionary Worker
Online 1997; Holhut 1997).
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Bell Atlantic Corp.
The Communications Workers o f America (CWA) strike substitute campaign aimed
at Bell Atlantic Corp. began on August 5, 1995 and involved 34,400 employees at
facilities located in Virginia, West Virginia, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware
(Swoboda 22 Aug. 1995).
Bell Atlantic Corporation operated as the parent company for seven telephone
services providers until it merged with GTE Corporation on June 30, 2000. Their original
areas o f operation were located in Washington, D.C., Inc. Maryland, Virginia, West
Virginia, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. Bell Atlantic was established on
January 1, 1984 when AT&T was forced to divest itself o f its 22 Bell companies by the
U.S. Department o f Justice. In 2000, it joined with GTE Corporation to form Verizon
Communications (Retrieved: 3 Feb 2006.www.fcc.gov/wcb/armis/carrier
filing historv/COSA Historv/bntr.htm).
The CW A’s campaign was set o ff by stalled contract negotiations (Swoboda 22
Aug. 1995). Issues providing obstacles for the settlement included B ell’s insistence on
givebacks in wage and benefits, the company’s push for subcontracted labor, and
demands for company reorganization— including the elimination o f jobs. The union was
opposed to these concessions and called for pay and pension increases and healthcare for
retirees (Swoboda 6 Dec. 1995).
At the onset o f the campaign, the CWA approved $5 million for radio and television
ads publicizing the conflict (Swoboda 6 Dec. 1995). The negative publicity campaign
targeted investors and focused on gaining sympathy from the public in order to compel
bargaining (Swoboda 6 Dec. 1995).
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Another tactic applied by the union was on-job actions. Members engaged in work
slow downs and sickouts (when union members call in en masse). Employees also began
to refuse to work overtime, which met with company retaliation, resulting in Bell
suspending the uncooperative workers (Mayfield 1995). These tactics were reportedly
ineffective, causing no discernible breaks in service and no impact on the company’s
bottom-line (Mayfield 1995).
Protests outside o f Bell facilities were also a frequent occurrence. Members
additionally held rallies at Bell headquarters (Mayfield 1995).
The corporate campaign against the company was called off by CWA when
negotiations resumed in December 1995. The end-results were not wholly favorable for
the union, whereby, for the purpose o f this study constitutes this case to be categorized in
the intermediate category. Givebacks included giving Bell the freedom to cut jobs and
launch broad reorganizing efforts, although, media provided no exact details regarding
how many jobs would be effected. In addition, it was also reported that the union failed to
accomplish provisions for company co-pays for retiree healthcare (Swoboda 13 Jan.
1996). CWA, however, did to negotiate a 0.5 percent pay increase and a 12 percent
enhancement in pension and healthcare benefits. The union also managed to persuade
Bell to refrain from subcontracting. The final contract was approved on January 12, 1996
(Swoboda 13 Jan. 1996).

Riese Organization
The three-year dispute between HERE and the Riese Organization began in January
o f 1996. The Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union (HERE) Local 100
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initiated the strike substitute campaign when their contract expired in January 1996. Main
issues contributing to the discord were lack o f job security due to restaurant closures, the
absence o f substantial and protected health insurance benefits, and pay concerns (Zuber
1997). The Riese Organization, operates as a subsidiary o f National Restaurant
Management Inc., which closed 25 unionized non-iranchised restaurants from 1994 to
1997, creating job losses for employees. They then, in turn, reopened them as franchised
facilities, which did not rehire the laid off employees and subsequently not covered by
prior union contracts (Zuber 1997).
Irving and Murray Riese founded Riese Organization, based in New York, in 1940.
Purchasing financially at risk restaurants and their accompanying property was the
company’s original strategy. This approach propelled Riese into developing chainrestaurants and the ‘food court’ concept. It is now one o f the largest restaurant
management companies on the East Coast. Properties currently owned by the company
include T.G.I. Friday’s, Dunkin’ Donuts, Houlihan’s, Martini’s, Kentucky Fried Chicken,
Nathan’s Famous, Knot Just Pretzels, Nedick’s, Tad’s Broiled Steaks, Lindy’s, Charley
O ’s, Tequilaville, Times Square Grill, Pizza Hut, and Roy Rogers (Retrieved: 5 Feb.
2006. http://www.rieserestaurants.com/corphistorv.asp).
Eighteen Riese restaurants and 450 union members were affected by the facility
closures. Lindy’s, Charley O ’s, Houlihan’s, Pizza Huts, Dunkin’ Donuts, Nathan’s
Famous, Roy Rogers and M artini’s and T.G.I. Friday’s were the properties targeted by
HERE Local 100 (Zuber 1997).
One o f the most frequently used tactics during the campaign was protest. Members’
intentions were to further their negative publicity campaign against Riese, painting the
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company as unfair to workers, and to heighten public awareness and support for their
grievances. Examples o f this action include a 200-person demonstration in front o f
Martini’s restaurant on 53d Street in January o f 1997 (Zuber 1997 and Greenhouse 1997).
A second direct attack against the company was a rally held in Times Square in February
1997 (Zuber 1997). This second swipe from the union aimed at criticizing Riese on the
issue of reopening their restaurants as nonunion facilities.
A negative publicity ploy used to target the company’s business associates during the
campaign was the development and distribution o f the “Investor Alert” (Prewitt 1997).
The “Investor Alert” pamphlet asserted that Riese Organization was fiscally unsound;
claiming that it was carrying too much debt, unable to pay its property leases, and
experiencing conflicts with franchisors. The literature also contended that the company
failed to meet its facility expansion plans and restaurant improvement objectives. The
“Investor Alert” was compiled by HERE’s research department and directed readers to
contact Local lOO’s offices for additional information (Prewitt 1997). Distribution o f the
pamphlet was primarily focused at rallies taking place outside financial conferences
where Riese representatives were looking for investors (Prewitt 1997 and Zuber 1997).
An additional tactic employed by the union was coalition building. HERE succeeded
in building alliances with clergy and various charitable organizations. The union achieved
worker support from the aforementioned groups in the forms o f additional protestors and
letter writers, all o f whom exerted pressure on Riese Organization. One such letterwriting campaign was aimed at Meals-on-Wheels. In the correspondence, there were
attacks on Meals-on-Wheels contributor, the president o f the Riese Organization, Dennis
Riese. The hope was that the charity would force Riese to bargain (Prewitt 1997).
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Local lOO’s publicity battle used information derived from Riese’s health code
violations (Greenhouse 1999). HERE members passed out pamphlets to people walking
by or attempting to enter any o f the company’s locations. The flyers contained health
inspector reports concluding that the restaurants had vermin in their dining areas and
kitchens. In December o f 1998, this particular tactic paid off, forcing Riese to concede to
most union demands. The breaking point was a New York Post article featuring a picture
o f a mouse sitting in the window o f a Manhattan Dunkin’ Donuts eating a doughnut.
Three weeks later, a resolution between HERE and Riese was reached (Greenhouse
1999).
January o f 1999 brought a clear win for the union, possibly due to Riese’s perception
that the union’s negative publicity campaign and consumer boycott would diminish
company revenues. Considering the vast amount o f publicity given by New York news
outlets which publicized union grievances and publishing the company’s documented
health violations, it is no wonder Riese felt that they were in a potentially precarious
financial position that, in turn prompted management to engage in negotiations.
A paramount gain for union members was all employees were presented with job
opportunities comparable to their former positions. Additionally given was back pay for
all employees who lost their jobs due to restaurant closures. HERE also achieved
assurances o f job security for their members. The contract arrangement entailed
provisions for location closures. If a location closed operations, Riese employees would
be offered positions at other facilities. Additionally included was an agreement stating
that if Riese Organization was to reopen a different restaurant in the same spot they had
closed, that facility would also be union (Prewitt 1999). The final arrangement regarding
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secured union representation provided for card-check recognition in Riese’s nonfranchise restaurants. However, union representation for the franchised sites required
elections. The organizing concessions gave an opportunity for the remaining 1,050 o f
Riese’s New York City employees to unionize (Greenhouse 1999).
Pay concerns were also addressed in the contract. Back-of-the-house and workers
who did not receive tips won an 11.5 percent raise and tipped employees received a 7.5
percent pay increase (Prewitt 1999). The initially sought after health insurance
protections and increases were not addressed in any o f the articles chronicling HERE’s
collective bargaining, so it is uncertain whether the union succeeded in regards to this
particular grievance.

Catholic Healthcare W est (CHW)
The organizing campaign initiated by the Service Employees Intemational Union
(SEIU) against Catholic Healthcare West (CHW) began in 1997 (Osorio 2005). Over 20
hospitals and 9,000 Californian medical technicians, foodservice workers, housekeepers,
and nurses at were involved in the campaign (Osorio 2005).
The Sisters o f Mercy o f Auburn in Burlingame, California founded Catholic
Healthcare West in 1986. It was originally composed o f 12 healthcare facilities. Since
then. Catholic Healthcare West has become the parent company o f 48 hospitals located
throughout California, Arizona, and Nevada (Retrieved: 11 Feb. 2006.
http://www.chsb.org/index.asp?catID=au&pg=au historv).
Organizing was launched to address wage issues, the expansion o f medical benefits,
and grievances concerning staff to patient ratios (Osorio 2002). The first tactic used was
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negative publicity. The SEIU bought full-page advertisement in California newspapers
charging that CHW were behaving hypocritically by practicing ‘cafeteria Catholicism’
(choosing to follow particular tenets o f the religion and not others) that denied its workers
social justice; the union additionally charged that the company attempted to intimidate
employees who spearheaded organizing efforts (Osorio 2002).
The SEIU further extended its campaign to include public accusations that the CHW
may have billed Medicare and Medicaid to recover costs o f its retaliatory strategies
against the organization campaign. The fallout from the allegations resulted in more
negative media exposure directed at CHW, and a backlash from the Congress o f
California Seniors, a retiree association, that filed suit against the company in May 1999,
which is still remains at this time undecided (Osorio 2002).
A final facet o f the union’s media blitz was bringing to the forefront the charity’s
hospital closing. The union released public statements positing that Catholic Healthcare
had disregarded communities’ needs for the hospitals, moreover, SEIU contended that no
opportunities were given for the localities to take over the hospitals prior to the closures
(Osorio 2002).
The union additionally attempted to pressured financial associates through their 1998
protest at Catholic Health Association’s annual fundraising meeting, in front o f which
activists handed out a pamphlet referred to as the ‘white paper’ (Osorio 2002). The flyer
accused CHW o f insufficiently funding charity healthcare (Osorio 2002). Other rallies
took place in the form o f on-job actions. Walkouts and demonstrations took place in July
and December o f 2000 (Osorio 2002).
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Coalition building was another tactic used by the SEIU. The union established an
alliance with the National Interfaith Committee for Worker Justice (Osorio 2002). The
group joined forces with the union, providing support at demonstrations and online
publicity for the organizing workers cause.
Catholic Healthcare West endeavored to prevent SEIU’s organizing efforts by
allegedly engaging in employee harassment and intimidation. CHW also publicly
demanded NLRB elections, consequently rejecting the union’s push for card check and
neutrality agreements (Osorio 2002). Neutrality agreements ensure that a company will
not interfere with organizing effort and card checks are a means o f foregoing the NLRB
election process through a majority o f workers signing a petition favoring union
representation.
In spite o f CHW ’s attempts to subvert the union, the campaign ultimately proved
successful. Catholic Healthcare agreed to allow card checks, resulting in hospital workers
confirming SEIU representation. The battle over pay and conditions ended on April 26,
2002 with a contract agreement. Wages acquired average increases o f 30 percent to 40
percent and benefits reaped a ten percent across the board gain. Provisions also
established formations o f in-hospital committees charged with addressing grievances and
issues concerning staff to patient ratios (Osorio 2005).

Continental General Tire
Local 850 United Steelworkers o f America (USWA) strike complement campaign
targeting Continental General Tire was launched September 20,1998. One-thousand,
four-hundred and fifty workers were involved in Charlotte, North Carolina action
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(International Federation o f Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Unions 11
Mar. 1999).
William F. O ’Neil and Winfred E. Fouse founded the General Tire and Rubber
Company in September 1915. The Akron, Ohio based company manufactures tires,
plastics, and chemicals. General Tire is a subsidiary o f German parent corporation
Continental, which purchased the organization in 1995, whereby creating Continental
General Tire (Retrieved: 8 Feb. 2006. ww w .continentaltire.com).
The core issue o f the Continental Tire case was Continental’s purchase o f General
Tire. USWA gave back roughly $90 million in benefits and pay cuts, allowing enough
time for the newly established company to become fiscally sound. By 1998, the company
had become profitable enough to reinstate pay and benefits to pervasive industry rates.
When the company refused to do so, the union voted to strike, resulting in the company
locking out employees and seeking to permanently replace them with temporary labor
(International Federation o f Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Unions 11
Mar. 1999). The union also sought to combat company demands for increased
production, 12-hour shifts, and mandatory overtime (Fowler 1999).
Protests were a principal tactic used by the USWA. Demonstrations were held to
pressure investor to divest from their Continental holdings and to encourage government
official’s involvement in ending the dispute. Rallies outside shareholder meetings and
German consulates in Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and
throughout the United States were conducted by sympathetic members o f the
International Federation o f Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Unions
(ICEM) (International Federation o f Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers'
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Unions 11 Mar. 1999). Global coalition building with the UAW and ICEM bolstered the
USW A’s solidarity drive leading to protests o f Continental facilities, trade shows, auto
dealerships, and tire retailers in several countries.
Calls for a boycott o f the company were publicized through leafleting and the
USW A’s cyber-campaign, which began on June 8, 1999. The negative publicity
campaign undertaken by the union focused on persuading Ford M otor Company dealers
to boycott Continental, who subsequently refused to discontinue their contracts with the
tire company. The union then began to target Ford’s customers, charging that Ford
vehicles were equipped with Continental’s faulty, low quality tires made by unproven
temporary workers; an additionally ineffective plea (International Federation o f
Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Unions 8 Jun. 1999).
The online action additionally provided opportunities for the public to email company
executives and German government officials to voice their concerns (Walker 2001). The
union website also made available toll-free telephone numbers for the customer relations
divisions o f Sam's Club and Wal-Mart Stores, two o f Continental primary retail outlets
(Walker 2001). Another feature o f the website was its offering o f downloadable flyers
that union supporters could circulate at their local tire retailers (Walker 2001).
The most valuable tactic used in the campaign was litigation, illustrating clear-cut
successes. Court involvement elicited by USWA included several unfair labor charges
filed with the NLRB accusing Continental o f violating federal statutes o f United Sates
labor law. Consequently, the NLRB ruled in April 1999 that the company had indeed
violated sections o f the National Labor Relations Act. The broken laws included failing
to relinquish information essential for bargaining to union representatives and performing
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illegal surveillance on employees involved in legitimate strike action (International
Federation o f Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Unions. 8 Jun. 1999).
Aside from court, validated retaliatory actions carried out by Continental, the
company additionally threatened to replace striking employees with temporary laborers.
Other measures taken included creating a company website in an attempt to defend itself
from the onslaught o f negative publicity produced by the cyber-campaign (Walker 2001).
The conflict ended on September 19, 1999 (International Federation o f Chemical,
Energy, Mine and General Workers' Unions. 20 Sept. 1999). The union won all
petitioned for concessions, most importantly, a return to work for all striking employees.
Provisions also achieved were increases for wages and cost o f living, pensions,
healthcare, secured seniority rights, denial o f mandatory overtime and random drug
screenings, and benefits for early retirement (International Federation o f Chemical,
Energy, Mine and General Workers' Unions. 20 Sept. 1999).

Goya Food Inc.
Union of Needletrades, Textiles, Industrial Employees (UNITE) began its organizing
campaign in 1998 and through two elections established and confirmed their
representation o f 120 Goya Food Inc. workers in the Florida plant (Glasgow 2000).
However, this was not the end, the campaign continued, increasing momentum in January
1999, when UNITE launched corporate campaign strategies targeting Goya (Hickey

200^L
Don Prudencio & Carolina Unanue founded Goya Foods Inc. in 1936. The food
processing plant was originally located in New York. Goya, now headquartered in
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Secaucus, New Jersey, has locations throughout the United States, Europe and the
Caribbean. It currently employs roughly 2,000 people in its 13 plants (Retrieved: 11 Feb.
2006. http://www.gova.eom/english/J.
The main issues hindering the settlement o f a first contract and the success o f the
organizing campaign were working conditions, wages, and establishment o f employee
healthcare benefits (Glasgow 2000). Another, more divisive factor was the Goya’s
recalcitrant anti-union stance.
Goya employees filed complaints with regulatory agencies, specifically the local
health department, OSHA, and the Florida Department o f Agriculture and Consumer
Services. Inspections from the health department resulted in the discovery o f rat and
insect infestations at the plant, leading to a temporary halt o f production and destruction
o f the hazardous foodstuffs. The report was also later used by the union, accompanied by
pictures o f the infestations shot by employees, in its negative publicity campaign and
furthermore sent to the Florida Department o f Agriculture and Consumer Services, which
additionally conducted several successive inspections o f the facility (Glasgow 2000 and
Hickey 2002). The Florida Department o f Agriculture and Consumer Services onsite
check of the plant produced yet another temporary plant closure.
OSHA, at UNITE’s request, inspected the plant as well, finding that the employee
grievances were well founded, subsequently fining Goya for ten breaches of safety
standards (Glasgow 2000).
Goya employees also embarked upon on-job actions. Application o f this tactic
included mass holiday sickouts, work stoppages, and onsite rallies. One particular work
stoppage that occurred lasted for more than 14 hours, shutting down the plant completely
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(Glasgow 2000). During the walkout UNITE made a public request for a one day boycott
of Goya products.
The negative publicity campaign also increased the public’s information concerning
Goya employee issues. Aside from the highly publicized rodent infestations, the union
activists and workers made appearances on M iam i’s local Spanish radio and television
programs, denouncing Goya management and explaining how they had been made to
attended mandatory meetings in which videos were shown that demonized unions. Other
allegations were made, both on air and through distributed literature, that managers had
harassed workers, questioning them about whether they supported the union, and making
statements that the company would close the plant if employees continued their attempts
to gain a contract. Goya retaliated against the union’s use o f public forums by placing its
own ads on the same stations repudiating w orkers’ accusations and justifying their own
stance (Glasgow 2000).
The previously stated charges and several other additional ones were brought before
the NLRB. UNITE filed unfair labor charges on behalf o f three employees who
contended that they were fired due to their union activities. In 2001, these charges were
found to have merit; a NLRB Administrative Law Judge enjoined Goya to give the
workers back their formerly held jobs (Glasgow 2000).
Another tactic used by UNITE to apply pressure on Goya was coalition building. The
union achieved support from community organizations including other labor
organizations, activists, and local religious leaders. They also gained support from state
Senator Kendrick Meek and House Representative Carrie Meek, who joined with the
union at a town hall meeting, making public statements criticizing Goya and urging a
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contract settlement. They also demonstrated with Goya employees and union supporters
outside the Goya plant (Hickey 2002 and Glasgow 2000).
Maneuvers to involve retailers that carried Goya products were also brought into
play. UNITE sent letters to Publix, Winn-Dixie, and Sedano's supermarkets asking for
their help in bringing Goya to the bargaining table. The requests went unanswered by the
stores (Glasgow 2000). However, protests were still held outside o f the retailers,
encouraging the stores and their customers to boycott Goya products (Hickey 2002).
The campaign proved to be a complete failure, company offers o f potential raises and
benefits increases diminished worker involvement and interest in the campaign (Glasgow
2000). The union succeeded in busting the union; no first contract was reached and in
December 2000, Goya withdrew its recognition o f UNITE as their workers’ bargaining
agent.

Cipriani Group
The New York based organizing and strike substitute campaign between Hotel and
Restaurant Employees Union (HERE) and the Cipriani Group restaurant and catering
service began in December 1998. The Ciprianis, fired 250 employees two days before
Christmas immediately after acquiring the Rainbow Room, whereby instigating the battle
(Bagli 13 July 1999).
The Cipriani Group, founded in 1958, own Harry's Bar in Venice, Italy, the SherryNetherland Hotel in New York, restaurants located in New York’s Grand Central
Terminal, a New York 55 Wall Street hotel, a catering hall on East 42d Street also in
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New York, a restaurant in SoHo, the Rainbow Room and other establishments in Buenos
Aires and Venice (Retrieved: 11 Feb. 2006. www.cipriani.comJ.
The dismissed employees had been represented by HERE Local 6 for several years.
The most antagonistic issue in this conflict, other than the layoff o f employees, was union
members’ outrage concerning workers who were hired to replace them. The new hires
were treated as non-unionized independent contractors (Bagli 16 M ay 1999). This
employment status allowed the Ciprianis to escape paying Social Security taxes, workers
compensation insurance, and disability on behalf o f their employees. In addition to the
aforementioned grievances, the temporary employees were hired at lower wages, lacked
job security and denied any benefits. The Cipriani family also retained the 22 percent
standard banquet service fee that is normally given to waiters as a gratuity. They asserted
that the charge was not a tip; instead, distributed to the servers as wages (Bagli 16 May
1999).
Another charge lodged by HERE against the Cipriani Group was that it discriminated
against hiring union affiliated candidates for jobs in their restaurants (Greenhouse 24 Jan.
1999). The Ciprianis’ confirmed this allegation by stating that they could not afford
unionized employees (Bagli 16 May 1999). HERE’s campaign goal was the rehire o f all
discharged employees with contract provisions providing pay, benefits and job security.
HERE Local 6 ’s corporate campaign actions began in January o f 1999, when the
union organized a picket line in front o f the Rainbow Room. Shortly thereafter, the
besiegement expanded to the Ciprianis' downtown restaurant in SoHo and to their
catering hall by Grand Central Terminal. Picketing at all three establishments continued
on a daily basis for the entire eight-month duration o f the conflict. The union’s initial
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demonstrations were also accompanied by a call for New Yorkers to boycott Cipriani
Group businesses (Bagli 13 July 1999).
Another aspect o f the campaign was that because o f the nature o f the establishments,
specifically that the eateries cater to wealthy high profile clientele, media provide
constant coverage o f the picketers simply due to their proximity to news worthy events
and personalities attending the restaurants. For example, leaflets were distributed by
HERE outside Cipriani's 42nd Street catering hall during the May 12, 1999 PEN Literary
Gala. PEN is an organization that defends writers’ freedom o f expression. Authors were
forced to choose between attending the charity events or support worker’s rights.
Newspaper and television reporters covered the protestors. They televised and published
the writers who broke the picket line and those who did not (Bagli 16 May 1999). This
event furthered HERE’s negative publicity campaign by increasing coverage for their
grievances with the Cipriani Group.
Other triumphs that may be ascribed Local 6 ’s corporate negative publicity and
boycott campaign strategies occurred in early May o f 1999. Paul Newman decided not to
host his Newman's Own/George Award at a Cipriani establishment (Bagli 13 July 1999).
An additionally visible success transpired when actor Leonardo DiCaprio and film
director Martin Scorsese also cancelled their yearly Film Foundation charity event due to
their reluctance to cross HERE’s picket lines (Bagli 13 July 1999). Other companies
canceling pre-booked events at Cipriani Group establishments included General Motors,
George Magazine, and Home Box Office (HBO) (Bagli 13 July 1999). The Cipriani
family claimed that the cancellations cost them tens o f thousands o f dollars and in
retaliation for their losses, filed lawsuits against HERE (Bagli 13 July 1999).
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HERE also engaged in efforts to compel regulatory agencies investigations o f
businesses breaches o f law; HERE’s persuaded New York’s Department o f Consumer
Affairs in May o f 1999 to investigate Cipriani’s absence o f an operating license for their
SoHo café (Bagli 13 July 1999). Cipriani was subsequently cited for failure to obtain
proper licensing for West Broadway establishment.
Retaliation from the Ciprianis was public and aggressive. First, the restaurateurs
attempted to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on their Sherry-Netherland Hotel
restaurant in M ay o f 1999 (Bagli 13 July 1999). The company filed with the intentions o f
striking back at the union for instigating and winning a $400,000 security bond to shelter
three months o f wages and benefits if the restaurant unexpectedly closed. However, the
primary holder o f the debt was Cipriani Corporation, which controlled 65 percent o f the
restaurant's outstanding debt (Bagli 13 July 1999). In sum, the Ciprianis were trying to
file bankruptcy against the very same debts they owed to themselves.
Other efforts to stonewall the union occurred in July o f 1999. The International
Brothers o f Teamsters Local 810 were given the opportunity to become central
bargaining agents for Cipriani Group properties. The Ciprianis perceived the union as
more complacent than HERE, expecting the Teamsters to negotiate more amenable
contracts (Bagli 31 Aug. 1999). Ciprianis’ efforts to unionize facilities through Local 810
failed when Teamster President James P. Hoffa issued a cease and desist order to the
Local, stating that they were not to interfere with HERE’s organizing efforts (Bagli 31
Aug. 1999).
In August o f 1999, HERE was victorious, primarily due to the leverage gained by
reducing company sales through the unions’ successful boycott efforts. HERE obtained a
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six-year contract with the Ciprianis. Included in the agreement were stipulations to 120 o f
the 250 Rainbow Room employees. Not all 250 workers were rehired due to the
restaurateurs’ plans to reorganize the Rainbow Room into a catering business (Bagli 31
Aug. 1999). In addition to the aforementioned, all o f the new hires at the facility were let
go. Another facet to their agreement was that the Ciprianis withdraw their $5 million
lawsuit against Local 6. The family also abandoned complaints that they had filed against
HERE with the National Labor Relations Board (Bagli 31 Aug. 1999). Additionally
achieved were firmly established terms regarding pay and tip scales, benefits, and job
security.

La Costa Resort and Spa
Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International Union (HERE) initiated its
strike complement campaign against California’s La Costa Resort and Spa in November
2001. Upon purchasing the resort in 2001, KSL fired all o f the property’s employees and
then demanded that they reapply for their jobs. Roughly, half o f the 500 fired employees
were rehired at lower wages, spurring workers to pursue strike actions (Shikes 2004).
Temporary employees replaced workers who had walked off the job. Other issues
provoking the campaign were centered on the majority o f reinstated employees’ loss of
health insurance; those who did receive benefits did so at increased contribution rates for
lesser packages (Simpson 2004).
KSL Resorts KSL operates Arizona Biltmore Resort and Spa, Grand Wailea Resort
Hotel and Spa in Hawaii, the Hotel Del Coronado in San Diego Califomia, the La Quinta
Resort and Club in La Quinta California, and the La Costa Resort and Spa located in
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Carlsbad California. CNL Hospitality Properties Incorporated, a subsidiary o f CNL
Financial Group Incorporated, owns the previously listed hotels and KSL management
enterprises. CNL is a real estate investment and financial services company whose center
o f operations is located in Orlando, Florida. CNL Financial Group was established in
1973 and began public trading in 1985 (Retrieved 31 Jan. 2006.
http://www.kslresorts.comJ.
Boycotts applied by the union realized limited results. As an act o f solidarity, the
AFL-CIO included the resort on the online boycott list, informing the public and their
members about the conflict. In March 2004, HERE contacted Palomar College,
encouraging the event coordinators to cancel their two scheduled fundraisers. The college
declined to do so, stating that the resort was the closest venue that had the capacity to
house the benefit and furthered that relocating the event would affect attendance and
ultimately the amount o f money raised (Simpson 2004).
A similar boycott failure took place in July 2004. Deepak Chopra was set to hold a
series o f health seminars at the facility, when contacted to relocate the events; he also
refused to do so. HERE held protests outside the hotel throughout the scheduled seminars
(Schiller 2004).
In August 2004, a letter writing campaign aimed at discouraging a North County
Times event was launched. These actions also met with failure and again HERE
alternately engaged in protests outside the event. (Jacoby 24 Aug. 2004).
Coalition building with union members employed at KSL sister properties resulted in
occurrences o f sympathy strikes at the Claremont Resort and Spa and the Hotel Del
Coronado (Schiller 2004). HERE also found support from the Interfaith Committee for
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Worker Justice. The faith-based organization also walked picket lines with union
members and attended demonstrations and rallies (Schiller 2004).
When La Costa became aware o f an impending strike, they did not seek to hurry
contract negotiations, or to rehire all o f the dismissed employees, instead becoming
castigatory. Union dues, normally paid directly from employee checks, were held back by
the company, resulting in a shortage o f revenue to fund the strike (Jacoby 1 Jan. 2005).
The company also discontinued their practice o f paying workers for lunch breaks (Jacoby
1 Jan. 2005).
The strike ended and HERE prevailed with a final negotiated contract on December
29, 2004. Back pay was awarded and all o f the striking workers were offered
reinstatement. Other components o f the agreement furnished healthcare packages
comparable to the ones the workers had prior to their dismissals, pay raises ranging from
50 to 55 cents an hour, and La Costa also agreed to pay into the union health benefits
fund (Jacoby 1 Jan. 2005). Perhaps the win was a product o f KSL fears o f prompting
further sympathy strikes from the Claremont Resort and Spa and the Hotel Del Coronado,
which would have had a negative effect on company profits.

Angelica Textile Services
The organizing and strike substitute campaigns undertaken by UNITE HERE and
aimed at Angelica Textile Services lasted for eighteen months, beginning in December of
2003. Contentious issues included inadequate pay, worker claims o f dangerous plant
conditions, and Angelica’s resistance to organizing nonunion facilities (Silber 2005).
Failure to renew expired contracts and efforts by UNITE HERE to use card check
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recognition procedures at several facilities were also sticking points to resolving the
conflict. Angelica declined to recognize union representation at ten nonunion plants
through card-checks, instead demanded National Labor Board elections (Goldeen 26 Apr.
2005). UNITE HERE already represented 24 o f Angelica’s 35 facilities (Goldeen 26 Apr.
2005). The union’s membership numbers at Angelica totaled 3,500 employees at the
onset o f the dispute.
Angelica Textile Services, based in St. Louis, Missouri, was founded in 1878. They
originally manufactured uniforms for various service industries. In 1968, Angelica
expanded to the hospital textiles rental market and throughout the 1970s became
increasingly vested in laundry services. They currently launder, provide gowns, assorted
linens, uniforms and bedding for close to 4,500 public health related facilities. They have
plants nationwide, with locations in Califomia, Missouri, Illinois, Nevada, Arizona,
Georgia, Florida, Texas, North Carolina, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and
Tennessee. They are a currently a public corporation, traded on the New York Stock
Exchange (Retrieved: 3 Feb. 2006. http://www.angelica.eom/ats/plants/J.
UNITE HERE instigated regulatory agency pressures on Angelica. This tactic was
facilitated by employee grievances at several plants that were filed with OSHA citing
potential health and safety violations and workplace hazards. These worker complaints
compelled investigations o f an Angelica facility in Batavia, New York. In August of
2004, inspection resulted in 21 violations and roughly $141,000 in fines (Katzanek 2005
and Feldstein 3 May 2005).
UNITE HERE also conducted on-job actions. Job walkouts were staged at the Texas
and New York plants, both lasting for roughly four hours (Williams 1 Jun. 2005).
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Angelica workers additionally held on site rallies and demonstrations throughout the
campaign (Ross 2005).
The union also launched a negative publicity campaign and calls for a boycott. After
a failed attempt to appeal to Sutter Health directly for an Angelica boycott, UNITE
HERE distributed postcards to Sutter Health’s clients in efforts to gain public pressure
against the company (Osterman 2005). Sutter Health is a contractor o f Angelica and
provides non-profit healthcare services throughout the entire region. The mailing asked
customers to no longer patronize the hospital and cast doubt on the cleanliness o f the
hospital’s facilities, more directly, on the cleanliness o f their linens (Osterman 2005).
Instead of operating to bring forth public support for negotiations, Angelica decided to
file a lawsuit against Unite Here (Osterman 2005). However, some clients did respond to
the information and placed concerned phone calls to Sutter Health. The outcome o f this
particular corporate campaign action has rather mixed results when considering that
neither the clients nor Sutter Health forced immediate negotiations from Angelica.
Increased publicity for the campaign brought opportunities for coalition building.
UNITE HERE obtained support for the union effort from Duke University students. Duke
University Health System, like Sutter Health, had refused to boycott Angelica as their
provider for its linen services. Students protested in March o f 2005 to force the university
into the conflict on behalf o f the Angelica employees (Bonner 2005). After the initial
demonstration and the school’s refusal to become involved, weeks o f protests on campus
followed, calling for Angelica to cease harassment o f union organizers and safe and
equitable conditions for the laundry workers (Bonner 2005 and Ross 2005). An additional
illustration o f the union’s success in forging alliances were promises o f solidarity from
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union allies who intended to support the Angelica employees. The workers planned to
strike on May 5 o f 2005. Teamster truck drivers, hospitals, healthcare centers, and
between eight and twelve other Angelica plants were prepared to refuse to deliver or
accept supplies from the Angelica plants, picket, or walk o ff their jobs in honor o f the
strike (Goldeen 3 May 2005 and Clough 2005). Fifteen-hundred workers in all backed the
employees who voted to strike in three California locations, two plants in Texas, one
facility in North Carolina, and another site in New York (Williams 6 May 2005).
Angelica was compelled to hire lawyers and public relations specialists to deal with
the UNITE HERE lawsuits and accusations, OSHA charges, and public image issues.
They also trained replacement employees and stockpiled linens in order to prepare for the
potential strike (Ross 2005). The union did indeed affect Angelica’s bottom line through
their corporate campaign efforts; Angelica incurred expenses equaling $2.5 million
throughout the 18-month confrontation (Feldstein 16 June 2005).
Despite Angelica’s initially immovable stance, talks continued past the strike
deadline and workers did not strike (Williams 6 May 2005). Angelica’s employees
prevailed in all o f their sought after concessions. Wages were increased, healthcare plans
improved, pension plans gained protection and issues pertaining to worker safety
discussed (Goldeen 16 June 2005 and Laidman 16 June 2005). Angelica’s resistance to
organizing nonunion facilities also abated. UNITE HERE achieved an agreement from
the company to organize its non-union facilities. The argument over organizing
procedures was resolved as well; Angelica conceded to card-check recognition in rightto-work states, however, in other states bargaining agents would be decided through
National Labor Relations Board supervised elections (Feldstein 16 June 2005).
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Case Comparisons
Overall, the cases examined generated eight proclaimed wins, three outcomes in the
intermediate range and four total losses. Examinations o f the contexts, the first
intervening variable, reveals results that are more comprehensive. Strike complement
campaigns, which was the most prevalent context in which corporate campaigns were
conducted, produced three losses— Bayou Steel Company, Ovemite Transportation
Company, and Detroit News and Detroit Free Press, two wins— Continental General Tire
and La Costa Resort and Spa. One o f the strike complement campaigns fell into the
intermediate category— Caterpillar. Lockouts, also in this category, yielded one win,
Ravenswood Aluminum Corporation, and one intermediate result, A.E. Staley
Manufacturing Company. The final strike complement affiliated case, BridgestoneFirestone Inc., had components o f a strike and lockout, which was a success.
Organizing and strike substitute campaigns both had two cases. Organizing
campaigns had a win. Catholic Healthcare West, and a single loss, Goya Food Inc.;
similarly, the strike substitute campaigns had one reported win, Riese Organization, and a
campaign in the intermediate category. Bell Atlantic Corp. However, within the contexts
o f organizing and strike substitute campaigns, there where two victories, the Cipriani
Group and Angelica Textile Services.
The second intervening variable, analyses o f specific tactics, produced diverse
findings. Pressure on government officials worked in the Ravenswood campaign, but did
not have reported outcomes for Bridgestone or Continental Tire cases. Moreover, when
considering the frequency in which the tactic was employed in successful cases, only two
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times, was compared to its application in defeated cases, never used, a conclusion may be
drawn that it is not one o f the more reliable strategies.
Boycotts were found to be a valuable strategy. The approach proved fruitful in
Bridgestone, Ovemite, Riese, Detroit News and Detroit Free Press, and Cipriani cases,
however, in three other cases, Goya, La Costa and Angelica Textile, boycott pleas were
flat out rejected by the businesses and individuals from whom they were requested. One
other instance. Caterpillar, gave way to inconclusive, unreported effects. Three additional
campaigns that attempted to use boycotts, Ravenswood, A.E. Staley, and Continental
Tires, revealed mixed results, with some o f their targets supporting boycott efforts and
others refusing. Boycotts were a leading strategy for some o f the unsuccessful campaigns
conducted, and a secondly dominate tactic employed by winning efforts.
Pressuring regulatory agencies was an infrequently applied tactic for both successful
and failed campaigns. However, in each event that it was applied, Ravenswood, Bayou
Steel, Goya, Cipriani Group, and Angelica, it yielded investigations and/or fines. This
leads to the conclusion that regulatory agency pressure is perhaps a significant strategy,
due to its potential impact on company revenue through fines and plant closures.
Coalition building was the top strategy applied in cases with successful outcomes and
a second tier approach for cases suffering losses. In ten instances— Ravenswood,
Bridgestone, Ovemite, Detroit News, Riese, Catholic Healthcare, Continental Tires,
Goya, La Costa, and Angelica, coalitions were formed and support found from other
unions, community groups, public figures and/or politicians. A.E. Staley was the only
case in which some unions withheld support. This tactic is also potentially beneficial for
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interrupting company supply lines, for example the Angelica case, and endangering
production.
Pressuring financial associates was a top approach used in failed campaigns.
Concurrently, unions that won used it intermittently. Ravenswood and Detroit News are
the two situations in which coercing financial associates resulted in financial losses or
involvement in spurring negotiations.
Litigation was a primary tactic used by unions involved in failed campaigns, whereas
uncommon in prevailing labor actions. The La Costa Resort and Angelica cases were the
only ones to reportedly experience success using the courts to further grievances, in spite
o f this, it is never expressly stated that the tactic was significant in bringing management
to the bargaining table. The outcomes for six other disputes that brought labor and safety
issues to the courts were inconclusive. However, litigation is time consuming and
lawsuits may not have been settled until far after the conflict was discontinued.
Successful campaigns rarely employed on-job actions and in defeated and
intermediate campaigns it was also applied infrequently. In Caterpillar Company, A.E.
Staley, and Bell Atlantic Corp. actions, the tactic was patently disastrous, resulting in
employers’ retaliation and stalled negotiations. The other three instances in which it was
applied had no concrete effects outlined.
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Table 5.1: Corporate Campaigns
Union
Business
Place(s)
Involved
U SW A

Ravenswood
Aluminum
Corporation

West
Virginia

Dates

Contexts

Tactics

Outcome

Nov. 1990Apr.1992

Strike
Complement
(Lockout)

-Pressured

Win

government
officials
-Boycott
-Pressured
regulatory

agencies
-Coalition

UAW

Caterpillar
Company

-Illinois,
Tennessee,
Colorado,
and
Pennsylvania

Nov. 1991Feb. 1998

Strike
Complement

UPIU

A.E. Staley
Manufacturin
g Company

Illinois

(no month
specified)
1992Dec.1995

Strike
Complement
(Lockout)

U SW A

Bayou Steel
Company

Louisiana

Jan.1993Sept.1996

Strike
Complement

building
-Pressured
financial
associates
-Litigation
-Protest
-Negative
publicity
campaign
-Protest
-Boycott
-On-job
actions
-Negative
publicity
campaign
-Pressured
financial
associates
-Litigation
-Protest
-Boycott
-On-job
actions
-Coalition
building
-Pressured
financial
associates
-Litigation
-Protest
-Negative

Intermediate

Intermediate

Loss

publicity

U SW A

BridgestoneFirestone Inc.

Illinois

Jul.1994Nov.1996

Strike
Complement
(Strike &
Lockout)

-Pressured
regulatory
agencies
-Pressured
financial
associates
-Litigation
-Pressured
government
officials
-Boycott
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Win

IBT

Ovemite
Transportatio
n Company

Teimessee

Oct. 1999hegirming
of2003

Strike
Complement

AFLCIO

Detroit News
and Detroit
Free Press

Michigan

Jul.1995Feb. 1997

Strike
Complement

CWA

Bell Atlantic
Corp.

Virginia,
West
Virginia,
N e w Jersey,
Pennsylvania
and
Delaware

Aug. 1995Jan.1996

Strike
Substitute

HERE

Riese
Organization

N ew York

Jan.1996Jan.1999

Strike
Substitute

SEIU

Catholic
Healthcare
West (CHW)

Califomia

(no month
specified)
1997Apr. 2002

Organizing

USWA

Continental
General Tire

North
Carolina

Sept.1998
Sept.1999

Strike
Complement

-Negative
publicity
-Coalition
building
-Pressured
financial
associates
-Litigation
-Boycott
-Coalition
building
-Litigation
-Protest
-Pressured
financial
associates
-Boycott
-Coalition
building
-Protest
-Pressured
financial
associates
-On-job
actions
-Negative
publicity
-Protest
-Negative
publicity
-Pressured
financial
associates
-Coalition
building
-On-job
actions
-Protest
-Negative
publicity
-Coalition
building
-Pressured
financial
associates
-Protest
-Negative
publicity
-Boycott
-Pressured
goverrunent
officials
-Coalition
building
-Pressured
financial

Loss

Loss

Intermediate

Win

Win

Win
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UNITE

Goya Food
Inc.

Florida

Jan.1999Dec.2000

Organizing

HERE

Cipriani
Group

N e w York

Dec.1998Aug.1999

Organizing
& Strike
Substitute

HERE

La Costa
Resort and
Spa

Califomia

Nov.2001Dec.2004

Strike
Complement

UNITE
HERE

Angelica
Textile
Services

Califomia,
N e w York,
Texas, North
Carolina

Dec.2003Jun.2005

Organizing
& Strike
Substitute

associates
-Litigation
-Negative
publicity
-Pressured
regulatory
agencies
-Boycott
-Coalition
building
-On-job
actions
-Litigation
-Pressured
regulatory
agencies
-Boycott
-Protest
-Negative
publicity
-Boycott
-Protest
-Coalition
building
-Pressured
regulatory
agencies
-On-job
actions
-Negative
publicity
-Boycott
-Coalition
building

Loss

Win

Win

Win

Negative publicity campaigns were used as a second tier tactic by winning,
intermediate, and losing conflicts. These campaigns yielded seven mixed and
inconclusive results, with the tactic bearing positive results for the Riese and Angelica
battles. In the Riese case, it was cited as the primary impetus for bringing management to
the table.
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Protests were used with moderate frequency by successful, intermediate, and failed
campaigns. However, out o f the ten cases in which protests were used, nine had
inconclusive reports on whether this tactic had any impact.
The control variables, concerning the external economic environment— considered in
relation to whether there was a recession during the time the campaign was waged and
legislative environment, assessed in terms o f state right-to-work laws, uncovered mixed
results. The impact o f a recession on the success or failure o f a campaign is negligible,
four cases were conducted throughout the recessionary periods o f 1990 through 1991 and
2001 through 2003. Ravenswood Aluminum Corporation, Catholic Healthcare West,
Cipriani Group, and La Costa Resort and Spa had positive outcomes despite the
recessions, leading to the conclusion that recessions have no significant impact on the
outcomes o f corporate campaign actions.
Right-to-work laws had a negative impact on the cases sampled. Seven cases
transpired in states with right-to-work legislation, which may have been a factor that
fundamentally contributed to three losses including Bayou Steel, Ovemite, and Goya.. In
the cases o f Goya and Ovemite, both companies successfully busted the unions by
offering increases in pay and benefits in order to diffuse worker participation in union
activities. These increases perhaps combined with workers fears o f being ‘employed-atw ill’ and may have led to the decertification o f the unions as the employees central
bargaining agents.
Union density, although not noted as a control variable, but an environmental feature
that may possibly impact campaign success, ended up being a paramount indicator o f
success. Six cases, Ravenswood Aluminum Corporation, Bridgestone-Firestone Inc.,
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Riese Organization, Catholic Healthcare West, Cipriani Group, La Costa Resort and Spa,
achieved positive outcomes possibly due to labor actions taking place in states that had at
least 14 percent union membership (LRA). Three o f the cases. Bayou Steel Company,
Ovemite Transportation Company, Goya Food Inc., that were pursued in areas with low
union membership, as indicated by states having eight percent or lower density, were
patently failures. Only one case. Continental General Tire, in the 15 studied, realized a
win despite low rates o f union membership.
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Table 5.2: Control Variab es
Union Density
Business
Union
Involved
(%)
USWA
UAW

UPIU
USWA
USWA
IBT
AFLCIO

Ravenswood
Aluminum
Corporation
Caterpillar
Company

A.E. Staley
Manufacturing
Company
Bayou Steel
Company
BridgestoneFirestone Inc.
Ovemite
Transportation
Company
D etroit News
and Detroit
Free Press

CWA

Bell Atlantic
Corp.

HERE

Riese
Organization
Catholic
Healthcare
West (CHW)
Continental
General Tire
Goya Food
Inc.
Cipriani Group

SEIU
USWA
UNITE
HERE
HERE
UNITE
HERE

La Costa
Resort and Spa
Angelica
Textile
Services

Recession

Rightto-work
laws

West Virginia-14.2

Yes

No

Illinois-16.8
Tennessee- 6.7
Colorado- 8.4
Pennsylvania-15
Illinois-16.8

No

Tennessee

No

No

Louisiana- 7.6

No

Louisiana

Illinois-16.8

No

No

Termessee- 6.7

Yes

Tennessee

Michigan- 21.6

No

No

Virginia- 5.3
West Virginia-14.2
N e w Jersey- 19.8
Pennsylvania- 15
Delaware-12.4
N e w York- 25.3

No

Virginia

No

No

California-16.5

Yes

No

North Carolina- 2.7

No

Florida- 6

No

North
Carolina
Florida

N e w York- 25.3

No

No

California-16.5

Yes

No

California- 16.5
N e w York- 25.3
Texas- 5
North Carolina- 2.7

No

Texas,
North
Carolina

Source: Labor Research Association- Union 1dembership: Density
By State (2004). http://www.laborresearch.org/charts.php?id=55
Source: Legal Database: Right to Work Laws
http://www.legal-database.com

117

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

This chapter presented backgrounds o f the cases sampled accompanied by
comprehensive illustrations o f the contexts in which they were fought and the events and
worker grievances provoking unions to initiate corporate campaign strategies.
There is no definitive answer to whether specific combinations o f tactics used in
specific contexts created more positive campaign outcomes. A certain tactic may work,
for instance, a union may succeed in its endeavors to engage regulatory agencies, but lose
the overall battle with management to negotiate for sought after concessions. However,
winning campaigns employed coalition building and negative publicity tactics more often
than their failed counterparts did. Contrarily, unions that fell short o f achieving their
goals are characterized by their consistent exercise o f strategies that proved uncertain—
pressing financial associates, litigation, and protest. The best projected combination of
tactics, based on reported success are coalition building, which is apparent in the sample
of cases achieving concession, and pressuring regulatory agencies, which was applied
infrequently, but in every instance exercised was successful.
Based on the examined strategies, a tactic that should be employed cautiously was
boycott. Boycotts tended to provoke management backlash and endanger company
bottom-lines, which could lead to job insecurity and loss. However, boycotts were
successful in many o f the cases. An ill-advised strategy is on-job action, primarily
because it achieved no discernible positive results.
After evaluating corporate campaigns contexts and methods it is clear that there is no
single formula for coercing management into bargaining, nor foolproof methods for
indicating consistent means in which to achieve concessions. Largely, evaluations o f
campaign scenarios and tactics arrive at no definitive conclusion that they will
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consistently bring union victories. However, it appears that the majority o f cases
examined, through applying corporate campaigns strategies, did achieve enough leverage
over targeted companies to gain some, if not all, sought after concessions.
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CHAPTER 6

C O NC LU SIO N

The primary goal o f this research was to examine if corporate campaigns achieve
employer concessions; moreover, whether unions have at their disposal an arsenal o f
tactics to use in specific contexts that will them to accomplish this end. Perry’s study
concluded that corporate campaigns “produced few, if any, ‘victories’ for those
conducting the campaigns” (Perry 1987, p. 123). Jarley and Maranto found that corporate
campaigns may be useful for initially establishing union representation and first
contracts. The overarching conclusion found in this study contradicts these prior results,
giving way to a favorable assessment o f corporate campaign applications. Despite the
methodological limitations o f this research regarding use o f a qualitative approach and
the previously stated downfalls o f possible selection biases, as opposed to quantitative
research, which may have provided more generalizable and certain results pertaining to
causality assertions and subsequent case outcomes, the applied methods did lend a
rigorous framework for exploring and confirming that corporate campaigns contribute to
successful outcomes for labor conflicts.
Most o f the cases studied yielded some concessions, although there are few cases
that point to specific campaign tactics, or context, which directly resulted in forcing an
employer to the bargaining table. Individual tactics are rarely credited as direct catalysts
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for forged concessions. Corporate campaigns are better regarded as a combination of
actions that incrementally build upon one another to place downward pressures on
company profits. These downward pressures on productivity and ultimately profit may
contribute to unions winning management concessions.
Most labor conflicts are still resolved through traditional negotiations as opposed to
corporate campaigns, a scenario that may change when considering that eleven out o f the
fifteen campaigns examined in this study achieved concessions. Finding that the majority
o f corporate campaigns had degrees o f success diverges from Jarley and Maranto’s
assertions that the most useful approach for achieving employer concessions is traditional
collective bargaining (Jarley and Maranto 1990).
However, there are compelling reasons that most unions do not engage in corporate
campaigns. First, the NLRB lends its support and recognition to labor actions, i.e.
traditional bargaining, that adhere to federal labor laws. On the other hand, corporate
campaigns tend to use tactics that sidestep the NLRB and labor laws in order to seek
support from the public or coerce individuals that are within corporate infrastructure to
gain favorable outcomes. Another reason unions generally abstain from engaging in
corporate campaigns is the emerging tendency to negotiate through Interest-Based
Bargaining (IBB). This form of negotiation does not frame outcomes in terms o f winning
or losing propositions, rather as a series o f compromises that produce mutually beneficial
agreements (Retrieved: 12 Mar. 2006. http://www.doi.gov/hrm/pmanager/labfaq.html).
This study has also posited that external environmental threats greatly undermine
corporate campaigns. Right-to-work laws present in twenty-two states, falling union
membership, massive layoffs, company reorganization, decreases in foreign direct
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investments, and outsourcing have come together to diminish worker solidarity and the
power o f unions to engage in meaningful collective action. These economic realities limit
the creation o f new jobs and operate to destabilize job security, whereby perpetuating
hesitancy and fear in workers who seek to make improvement to their contracts, or
initially establish union representation. Now existing is a prevalent stance within the
American business community that it will continue to retaliate and fight against
concessions, demand givebacks, use the courts, and generally seek to draw out battles
until unions concede defeat.
Kate Bronfenbrenner gives insight to the immediate threats union members are
subject to from businesses seeking to bust unions:
“This is also a climate where employers are getting more and more sophisticated
and aggressive in their opposition to unions. Never has capital been more mobile,
never has the threat to move plants in the context o f organizing been more
credible. Employers have found a set o f legal and illegal tactics that are extremely
effective in thwarting union organizing efforts. The majority o f employers
threaten to close if workers organize; one in four employers discharge employees
for union activities; and employers commonly use a combination o f other tactics,
including mandatory captive audience meetings, bribes, surveillance, threats,
promises, and literally creating a climate o f constant harassment, fear and
intimidation” {The Multinational Monitor 2003, p. 21).
Retaliatory measures have proved to be a way in which management and business
have adapted to corporate campaign measures, operating to slow the momentum o f
widespread adoptions o f corporate campaigns and perhaps limiting the frequency in
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which corporate campaign actions are undertaken. Two cases, Bayou Steel and Detroit
News, clearly illustrate businesses adaptation to corporate campaigns. Both companies
filed RICO charges; these criminal allegations played vital roles in ending the conflicts
and forcing union retreats and subsequent losses for members involved.
Aside from this study’s concerns pertaining to external environmental, the research
results may also have possible implications for examination of unions and social
movement literature as a whole. Resource mobilization theory, specifies that collective
interests, labor unions, must unite and intelligently exert their shared resources in order to
achieve labor movement goals. These combined factors are present throughout most o f
the cases examined and possibly suggest a fundamental approach required to consistently
waging successful campaigns; worker solidarity and focused applications o f money and
mobilization realize positive outcomes. Bearing this in mind, it may be posited that
expanding the labor movement throughout sectors and across industries, and gaining
cohesive worker solidarity, are possibly viable solutions for increasing labor’s power and
the frequency with which corporate campaign are applied and victorious. These may be
necessary steps towards continuing corporate campaign success and building labor
movement momentum, especially if business continues to adapt to campaign strategies.
The second implication this research has on examinations o f corporate campaigns and
social movements is that the external economic realities for businesses affect workers.
Outsourcing and import competition are two economic dilemmas negatively impacting
U.S. employees, which would perhaps become surmountable through an international
expansion o f the labor movement focused on universal improvements o f wages and work

123

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

conditions. Businesses would no longer be able to exploit cheap labor and additionally
unable to undercut each other in terms o f production costs.
Corporate campaigns analysis provides information concerning divergences from
traditional collective bargaining. Tactics will continue to evolve, and the effectiveness o f
these alternative tactics will require evaluation. Moreover, a future direction for these
types o f analyses will perhaps call on researchers to include a large enough sample size to
draw conclusions that are more definitive on whether corporate campaigns work. Further
research will hopefully encompass changing tactics and possess systematic data to
conduct comprehensive quantitative analysis.
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